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I
"Innocents A broad"
Jeremy Bentham, exacerbated by the iniquities and inadequacies
of the i8th Century law of evidence, once described the law as the
"art of being methodically ignorant of what everybody knows." '
Intelligent revamping of the exclusionary rules and other parts of
the procedural common law has largely outmoded this as a fair
characterization of Anglo-American municipal law. But it can still
serve as an apt description of the current substantive status of inter-
national law.
For example, despite the persistent buffetings of reality, conven-
tional international law still resolutely disclaims any real respon-
sibility for the regulation of international economic affairs,2 leaving
those affairs to be determined fortuitously by commercial usage, or
t A. B., M. A., 193o, LL. B., 1933, Columbia University; Chief, Decree Section,
Anti-Trust Division, Department of Justice.
The views herein expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Department of Justice.
i. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EvEcE 6 (Dumont tr. 1825).
2. The laissez-faire orientation of international law on commercial matters has
been acknowledged as its most striking inadequacy. See BRmaLY, THE OuTiOOIC FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8, 11-12 (1944).
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by some municipal law happily in appropriate "contact" with the
business transaction in question, or by some transitory compact be-
tween sovereign states. Faced by a collocation of states varying in
pith and power from Ethiopia to one of the Big Four, international
legal doctrine can still cling fondly and delusively to an antiquated
conception of the sovereign equality of states.3  Confronted with
independent enclaves in the international community that have'obvi-
ously obtained preponderant power in the economic sphere (such as
international cartels and combines, shipping pools, or international
commodity agreements), inteinational law blithely continues to assert,
first that states are unqualifiedy sovereign, and second, that only
states can be the "subjects" of international law.4 Implicit in this
notion of exclusivity has been the Studious neglect of the fact that
the state is an aggregation of individuals; this has resulted in ascrib-
ing to the state an exalted metaphysical status free of the moral and
social limitations that are expected to ground the social intercourse of
individuals and other kinds of groupings of individuals. In fascist
lands, this trend was pushed so far as to obliterate completely the
sensible concern of the state for the welfare of its citizens, and to make
power and rapacity the effective mainsprings of international action
and war its ideal manifestation; even in the more democratic coun-
tries, the theoretical gulf between the private individual and the ideal-
ized state still serves to deprive the sluggish and brackish waters of
international law of the ability to draw on the refreshing and extensive
streams of private law doctrine and experience. 5 It has become
apparent that the obligations and duties which are generated by inter-
national combines and similar business associations are on an eco-
nomic plane different from, and frequently contradictory to, the
political loyalties and allegiances implicit in the concepts of nationality
3. See DicxiNsoN, TiE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERATIONAL LAW (I920).
This is, of course, no criticism of the democratic tenet, part of the current ambiguous
connotation of sovereign equality, that states, like individuals, are equal before the law.
4. See, for a general discussion, PoLrns, THE NEW AsPEcTs OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18-31 (1928) ; Timberg, An International Trade Tribundl, 33 GEo. L. J. 373, 394-8
(1945). Theoretically, individuals and other legal "persons" may be the "objects" of
international law, i. e., like pieces of property they may be the "object" of relationships
certified by international law. However, multiplication of the objects of international
law serves only to increase the number of chessmen on the international chessboard,
whereas the real need of international law is for more effective chess players ("sub-
jects").
5. See LAUTERPACHT, PRivATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALoGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 44, 48, 49 (1927). This reluctance to draw upon private law analogies has been
attributed to a "positivist" temper of mind on the part of international lawyers. This
is doubtless verbally correct, but it would seem to be a somewhat provincial type of
positivism that will overlook the facts of everyday life and plump so vigorously for an
abstract Hegelian concept of sovereignty.
The recent Nuremberg trials are an indication that individuals will be held amen-
able to international criminal law. This may be a prelude to rendering individuals sub-
ject, under international law, to contractual and other civil liabilities.
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or citizenship. The law, however, is still in the difficult process of
being weaned away from the proposition that these international enti-
ties are nationals of some state or other, or that their "citizenship"
has other than purely domiciliary implications.6
These shortcomings of international law are but reflections of
the disparity between the territorially fragmented nature of legal
systems and the integrated nature of business organization and eco-
nomic practice. Businessmen have recognized (or at least have insti-
tutionalized without recognizing) the international interdependence
of economic life and have, accordingly, developed international
frames of organization for international economic activity. Law-
yers, on the other hand, have adhered to rigidly compartmentalized
national legal systems, which are unable to cope with an economic
order of international dimensions. Since social organisms like com-
bines are impossible without some type of governing law, however
rudimentary and inconsistent, it is not strange that international
combines have eclectically pressed into their service whatever "law"
would serve their purposes. It is also no cause for surprise that any
law which is called into being solely by the necessities and ambitions
of an international corporation does not, as a matter of inherent
necessity, conform to the social and political interests that prevail
within the boundaries of the respective national states.
This article deals with perhaps the most potent of the newer
institutions dominating the international economic scene, the inter-
national combine. An international combine may be roughly defined
as a business organization characterized by (a) business operations in
two or more countries, (b) a unified top direction, and (c) legally
distinct but economically dependent business units subject to that uni-
fied direction. 7 The unified top direction may take the form of (I) a
holding company; (:2) an operating company maintaining a parent-
subsidiary relationship to the dependent units; or, more rarely, (3)
personal identity of top management personnel (as in the case of an
American "trust"). So pervasive has become the practice of sepa-
rately incorporating the dependent units of the combines, that inter-
6. See NuSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PsvArE INTERxATioNAL LAW 146-7 (1943);
Baty, The Rights of Ideas-and of Corporations, 33 HAi~v. L. REV. 358 (1920) ; Hamil-
ton, The Economic Man Affects a National Role, 36 Am. EcoN. REv. 735 (1-946);
Timberg, Corporate Fictions, 46 COL. L. Rv. 533, 571-4 (1946).
7. The German analogue of the combine, the so-called Konzern, has been defined
as a "merger of firms which remain juridically independent of one another into a single
unit for the purposes of productive technique, administration, trading, or (especially)
finance." LIEFMANN, CARTELS, CONCERNS AND TRUSTS 225 (1932). The definition
here used is contrary to the British usage, where combines include cartels. See PLUm-
MER, INTERNATIONAL COMBINES INq MODERN INDUSTRY I8 (1938). In fact most of
Plummer's book, despite its title, is devoted to what, in American literature, are called
"cartels."
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national combines may in the usual case also be validly described as
multinational corporations."
This article will attempt to indicate:
First, why, within its own sphere, the international com-
bine has, to a large extent, wrested the substance of sovereignty
from the so-called sovereign state;
Second, the extent to which it has become difficult and im-
proper to ascribe to the combine (or its corporate members) the
quality of nationality and citizenship, which characteristically
implies a type of dependence on the political sovereign and sub-
servience to the public interest represented by that sovereign;
Third, the consequent inability of national states and na-
tional systems of law and polity to cope with the activities of
international combines;
Fourth, the further consequent necessity for both national
states and the international community to cast off the illusion
that the public interest in international economic activity is ade-
quately safeguarded by national action alone, and to undertake
some measure of conserving that interest in their own behalf
and on their own initiative.
Unawareness of the complex significance of the international
combine is not the exclusive prerogative of the international lawyer.
Although the activities of international cartels have aroused con-
siderable discussion among economists, lawyers, and those who are
thoughtful about the art of politics, this has thus far not been true
of the acts of international combines. Yet international cartels
(loose-knit combinations of potentially resurgent competitors) are
made both possible and perdurable by the fact that the membership of
the cartels consists of large international combines (tight-knit com-
binations, frequently of liquidated competitors)." Cartels are re-
8. As to the factors accelerating this process, see pages 583-587 below. Consoli-
dations and mergers which have obliterated all independent legal units (see vox BE KE-
RATH, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 221 (1933)) do not as a rule obtain on the
international scene. However, the conclusions applicable to combines apply generally
to the relatively infrequent cases of large single corporations with multinational stock
ownership, or with extensive foreign investment holdings of a non-corporate nature
(such as unincorporated sales agencies or branches, real estate, etc.).
9. E. g., I. G. Farben, Imperial Chemicals and du Pont in numerous chemical car-
tdls; I. T. & T., Siemens-Halske, and others in the communications equipment industry.
The reader will find the references to the illustrative examples given in footnotes 9 to 17,
in addition to others of a like nature, in PLUMMER, op. cit. supra, note 7; HEXNER,
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1945); BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE TO A FREE WORLD
(1944) ; Hearings before the Sub-Committee on War Mobilization of the Senate Coin-
mittee on, Military Affairs on Sen. Res. 5o7 and 702, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) (con-
ducted by Senator Kilgore) ; Hearings before Senate Patents Committee on S. 2303
and 2491, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (943) (conducted by Senator Bone).
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garded as transitory in character and as needing constant renewal,
whereas combines are presumptively permanent in operation, and
difficult to dissolve. In fact, the combine has been regarded by
imaginative industrialists as the ideal form, the "final cause", towards
which the transitory and impermanent cartels were evolving.'0 In
some industries, the combine has already supplanted the cartel as the
most inclusive framework of international economic organization,
covering the preponderant part of the industry.:" Furthermore,
many cartels do not rely solely upon contractual commitments among
their members but are largely held together by reciprocal stock par-
ticipations on the part of their members; 12 the difference in staying
power between a cartel characterized by both contractual and corpo-
rate interconnections of this type, and one characterized by contractual
relationships alone, is the difference in tensile strength between
ordinary and reinforced concrete. Partial adoption of combine ma-
chinery to procure added smoothness of operation for international
cartels is also to be found in the widespread cartel practice of form-
ing corporations for the purposes of buying up and removing from
production excess plant capacity,13 developing patents and tech-
nology,' 4 engaging in joint manufacturing and sales operations,'15 or
otherwise acting as the cartel's administrative agency.',
One important advantage of the tight-knit combine edifice is
that it is conducive to increased secrecy of business operations.
Secrecy of operation, in turn, enables business relationships to escape
observation and hence correction at the hands of the law or the state.
The reason for this lies not only in a more disciplined and cohesive
organization but also in the fact that legal systems involve, in one
io. See MOND, INDUSTRIES AND PoIiciEs 236 (1928) ; Hjalmar Schacht, as quoted
in PioTaowsiI, CARTELS AND TRuSTS, 55 et seq. (1933).
ui. E. g., the International Nickel Company in the nickel field; Climax Molyb-
denum in the field of molybdenum; La Forestal Land, Timber and Railways, Ltd., in
the quebracho industry; Borax Consolidated and American Potash and Chemical in the
borax industry.
12. E. g., I. T. & T. and L. M. Ericcson in the communications equipment field;
S. K. F. in the ball bearings industry.
13. E. g., Alliance Aluminium, the Swiss company that was the central agency of
the international aluminum cartel; the Swiss joint stock company organized to elim-
inate excess nitrogen producing plants.
14. E. g., Magnesium Development Corporation in the magnesium field; the Inter-
national Hydrogenation Patents Company, Ltd., organized in Liechtenstein to carry out
cartel commitments on the part of I. G. Farben, Standard Oil, and Royal Dutch Shell.
i. E. g., the various companies signifying the cartel cooperation of du Pont, Rem-
ington and I. C. I. in Latin-America; Canadian Industries, Ltd., performing a sim-
ilar service in Canada; the Diamond Syndicate in London in the field of industrial
diamonds; the Courtaulds' manufacturing subsidiaries in the rayon field. See, in this
connection, United States v. U. S. Alkali Export Association, 58 F. Supp. 785 (S. D.
N. Y. 1944) ; WARD-JACKSON, A. HISTORY OF COURTATJLDS 138-9 (1941).
16. E. g., the International Cable Development Corporation (creature of the Prin-
cipality of Liechtenstein) in the field of electric cables; the Phoebus Industrial Com-
pany for the Development of Lighting, a Swiss corporation operating for the inter-
national incandescent lamp industry.
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way or another, the regulation of "relationships" between "legal en-
tities." The formation of a combine, since it obliterates hitherto
independent entities, automatically destroys the legally cognizable
relationships existing between them.1 Thus, for example, a proxy
fight in a large combine may result in a redistribution of patronage,'
outside contracts and emoluments that would make any large politi-
cal machine lick its chops, yet the law and the state are powerless to
intervene, except as nominal referees, because such a proxy fight in-
volves only the "internal affairs" of the corporation-a single legal
unit-and involves no injury to other "persons" with legal standing.
Conflicts over individual company policies may involve economic and
social consequences which, if they were discussed in a legislative
forum, would result in extended hearings and debates; yet, if done
within the corporate framework, the law is content to pass them by,
whatever their scope, with the notation that they are matters within
the "discretion" of the company's officers and directors.: 8
II
A Few "Economic States"-Their Claim to "Recognition"
The test for the recognition of a political government is that it
is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population and exercises
authority within its territory and is willing and able to fulfil its inter-
national obligations. 19 Applying these standards in the economic
sphere, it is hard to see how international combines have avoided
"recognition" at the hands of international law. Deft indeed, also,
must be the rationales, whereby combines such as the following man-
17. Concurrently with this development has taken place a shrinkage in the field
of relationships which can truly be described as contractual, due to such factors as the
use of standard forms, the vast coverage of newer types of collective labor and
other agreements and the large powers of the parties involved. See Isaacs, The Stand-
ardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L. J. 34 (1917); Duguit, Collective Acts as Distin-
guished from Contracts, 27 YALE L. J. 753 (i9x8). Because of the fact that the bulk of
commercial law has evolved in terms of more conventional criteria of contract, the dis-
placement of contract relationships by status relationships has presented an additional
obstacle in the way of the law's taking account of a contemporary economic institution
like the combine. Recent developments in municipal law, such as those which ground
legal liabilities on a course of dealings or other circumstances as well as on an exchange
of words and commitments are encouraging indications of a new-found resiliency in the
law that may be able to cope with this disappearance of contractual elements in con-
temporary business life. Cf. American Tobacco Company v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct.
1125 (1946).
The dissenting voice of Captain Oliver Lyttleton, for ten years manager of the
international tin cartel, may be noted. He has said that the managers of single large
monopolistic firms like Unilever or I. C. I. cannot evade their social obligations, and
that it is cartel management which needs watching. The Economist, Apr. 5, 1941, PP.
436-7.
18. Defective as the law is in appraising the social and political implications of
corporate and combine "legal personality" from the standpoint of external relation-
ships, it is probably even more deficient in taking account of the internal administrative
workings of that "personality."
1g. Lauterpacht, Recognition of Governments, 45 CoL. L. Rxv. 815 (1945).
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age to maintain a theoretical "nationality" and loyalty to a "sover-
eign" state that would seem to be continually belied by their day to
day operations:
(a) The world's most important artificial waterway is run by
an Egyptian joint stock company; the majority of that company's
shares and directors are French. Despite the legally most plausible
Egyptian and French "nationality" of this company and its majority
control, the Suez Canal Company has been traditionally assumed to
be an instrument of British trade, colonial and foreign policy; cer-
tainly its development has not been primarily dictated by its geo-
graphical location in the Mediterranean-Moslem world. Perversely
enough, the international ownership of the company's stock was only
recently advanced by the United Kingdom government as a reason
why it was not in a position to credit, in favor of the United States on
the United Kingdom's Reverse Lend-Lease account, toll and other
charges incurred by American vessels passing through the Canal.20
(b) The most critical food shortage throughout the continent of
Europe during the past war was in fats and oils. That field, encom-
passing among other things the manufacture of soap, candles, and
margarine, is dominated by the Unilever combine, a corporate aggre-
gate including over 6oo companies. Unilever has crushing and refin-
ing factories and wholesale and retail outlets all over the continent of
Europe and in the Dutch East Indies; it dominates the economy of
West Africa. It has been said of it that "it controls the working life
of the vegetable oil industries almost as completely as the Soviet
monopolizes the working life of the Russian people. It embraces
every activity from the production of the raw materials to the retail
selling of finished goods. And curiously enough both the Soviet and
Unilever catch whales in the Antarctic. For the investor and econ-
omist, however, the significant feature is that the more enlightened
and efficient Unilever and the Soviet become, the more difficult it is
to investigate their operations and to analyse their accounts." 21 Uni-
lever is controlled by twin holding companies, one incorporated in
England and one in Holland; thi directorates of these two private
companies interlock, and each of them controls 50o of the voting
power of the other.22 Does this type of dual national control augur a
further devolopment which will ultimately merge the British and
Dutch empires into a political condominium that will match their cur-
rent economic interweaving? 23
2o. See WiLsoN, THE SUEZ CANAL 15, 22, 170 (2d ed. 1939).
21. The Economist, June II, 1932, p. 300.
22. See PLUMMER, op. cit. supra, note 7 at 41-46.
23. This economic partnership is reminiscent of the situation obtaining in the i8th
Century, when a third of the capital of the English East India Company, and extensive
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(c) A Swedish industrial magnate committed suicide in a Paris
penthouse in 1932. His act unnerved banking and investment houses
in financial centers from Boston to Istanbul, precipitated the insol-
vency of A/B Kreuger and Toll, a Swedish company dominating the
match industry of the world, and 15o Kreuger subsidiaries located in
twenty-eight countries, and revealed that Kreuger had swindled the
investing public of over half a billion dollars. It even affected ad-
versely the financial standing of many countries which had tied in their
state match monopolies to the Kreuger empire; like the shrewd pri-
vate bankers, their governments had floated bonds and made financial
commitments to an enterprise whose major assets were apparently the
Kreuger talent for secrecy and the gentlemanly reluctance of busi-
nessmen to probe into his reticence. Bondholders' committees and
trustees sent'representatives all over the continent of Europe in one
of the most fascinating and frustrating treasure hunts of all time-
where and how valid were the assets of the Kreuger companies?
Thirteen and a half years later, the trustees of International Match
Corporation-the United States company which was the largest sub-
sidiary of the Kreuger empire and had an annual sales volume of 14
million dollars-finally completed their report.
24
(d) The management of one of the largest drug chains in the
world, incorporated in the United States, had for years been able to
show non-existent values and inflated profits, by fictitious accounting
entries covering inventories in non-existent Canadian warehouses,
miraculous shipments entirely by truck from Johannesburg, South
Africa, to New York City, etc. The accounts of this company were
audited by the firm that was the leader of the American accounting
profession; yet the fraud on the nation's investors continued for years
and was finally uncovered by indirection.
25
(e) N. V. Phillips Gloeilampenfabrieke before the war was a
Netherlands holding company in the radio and electrical equipment
field, owning and directing approximately eighty subsidiaries -located
in Europe and South America. Sensing the imminence of the Axis
onslaught, the Phillips executives moved their head offices to Curacao
in the Dutch West Indies. Subsequently, the companies located in
the Axis and the Axis-overrun countries continued to remain under
the corporate aegis of the Netherlands corporation, which was first
stock interests in the Bank of England, belonged to the Dutch and other foreigners.
See Du Bois, THE ENGLISH BusiNEss COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE AcT 283, 308
(938).
24. See PLUMm ER, op. cit. supra, note 7 at 49-52; Time, Nov. 5, 1945, pp. 88, 90.'
25. See SEC, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION IN THE MATER OF MCKESSON AND RoB-
BINS, 3-4, 13 et seq., 4 et seq. (1940).
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placed under the control of executives of Phillips' German enterprises
and ultimately of personnel even more subservient to the Nazis.
However, the Phillips executives also ranged themselves on the side
of the angels by drafting an elaborate British trust covering the
British Empire subsidiaries of their organization, and an equally con-
voluted American trust for their United States and Latin American
enterprises. When war came, therefore, the leading executives of
the organization were able to leave Holland and assume active man-
agement of the British and American trusts and of the Curacao com-
panies. With characteristic corporate impartiality, Swiss companies
appeared as subsidiaries either of the Curacao or the Netherlands
holding company, and Argentine subsidiaries emerged under both the
English and the American trusts.26 Well may such corporations be
envied their amoeba-like fecundity and the psychological and political
ease with which they are able to change and neutralize their "nation-
ality."
III
One Economic Universe Lost in the Legal Galaxy
The antithesis, or at least lack of correlation, between corporate
purpose and national policy in the foregoing cases is clear. The Suez
Canal and Unilever Companies, to the extent that they exploit im-
portant natural resources for the benefit of major industrial powers,
can hardly be expected to be passionately devoted to the welfare inter-
ests of the minor colonial states where those resources are geographi-
cally placedY Kreuger and Toll, and McKesson and Robbins, are
examples of how readily corporations of an international character
can become instruments for violating a national policy not challenged
in any civilized country-that of protection against fraud. The saga
of N. V. Phillips indicates how complacently a multi-national corpo-
26. See EDWARDS, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
(1944), Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Monograph I
(1944), pp. 70-1.
27. As far back as ADAM SMITH, WFALTH OF NATIONS, 601-603 (Mod. Library ed.
1937) it was pointed out that the British East India Company's interest as a commercial
monopolist must necessarily run counter to its interest as the political sovereign of
India. Its interest as a monopolistic trader was in buying Indian commodities cheap in
order to sell at an enhanced profit, while its interest as the sovereign of India is to
enlarge its revenues by buying dear in India. In an era when the East India Com-
pany no longer has sovereign political responsibility for the government of India, the
incompatibility between trader and sovereign still remains.
For an interesting analysis of how the exploitation of nitrates by the Guggenheim
interests in Chile kept on showing financial profits to those interests, favored local public
officials and local representatives of the nitrate companies, but afforded no correspond-
ing return in the way or revenues or employment to the native economy, see McCon-
nell, The Chilean Nitrate Industry, 43 J. POL. Ecox. 506, 5ii et seq. (Ig35). The
author's conclusion is that "government stability in Chile becomes a problem in cor-
poration finance." Id. at 528.
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ration can detach its functioning from that most fundamental of na-
tional crises-the conduct of war; yet it is notorious how subtly and
tenaciously other international combines can become the enemy work-
ing within our midst.28 Corporations with global connections, singly
or in concert, have been able successfully to ignore or to circumvent
numerous other economic and social policies of similar broad import,
including taxation, price control, the stockpiling of essential mate-
rials, antitrust policy, prohibitions against trading with a resistant
enemy, and disarmament restrictions sought to be imposed on de-
feated enemies.
2 9
In fact, opposition or indifference to the policies of specific na-
tional governments is inherent in the nature of the international com-
bine. A corporation, for example, cannot be a subservient vassal of
the German dynastic state without at the same time being the enemy
of those nations with which Germany is at war. It is only politically
neutral or apathetic multi-national corporations which can avoid con-
scious disloyalty to some of the national states on whose economy
they impinge; patriotism to any one nation inevitably brings in its
train some disloyalty and disservice to other members of the inter-
national community.
It is not feasible to generalize concerning the extent to which
international combines are corporate Switzerlands, with the bland
"economic man's" impartiality to the political and social interests of
specific national states, or the extent to which they are conscious
economic janissaries of militant governments, equipped to win for
those nations either peace-time economic gains or war-time political
advantage. The answer to this general question is dependent on a
number of local circumstances, such as the national predilections of
particular corporate managements, the basic economic and political
philosophies of the governments and peoples of the respective states,
the nature of the corporation's operations, the significance of those
operations to the state. Because the United States has a non-dynas-
tic political system and an economy in which international trade plays
a significant but not a crucial part,80 we have been inclined to let our
28. The fact that every major power involved in the last war has had to enact
legislation to take care of enemy property is proof of this. See also United States v.
Chemical Foundation, Inc., 294 Fed. 300, 308 (D. C. D. Del. 1924), aff'd., 5 F. 2d 191,
197 (C. C. A. 3d 1925).
29. This essay does not deal with situations where it is the cartel alignments of a
corporation that lead it to flout its own national interests. Those situations have been
dealt with in BERGE, ot. cit. supra, note 9; EDwAR~s, EcoNOMIC AND POLITICAL As-
PECTS or INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1944) (a study for the Subcommittee on War
Mobilization of the Senate Military Affairs Committee); MORGENTHAU, GERMANY Is
OUR PROB-a 24-39 (1945).
30. See, e. g., FRANK, SAvE AMERICA FIRST io9 et seq. (1938). It is of course
true that mere quantitative evaluations of the volume of American foreign trade do
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international combines drift along the path of political neutrality.
The Germans, with their highly organized militaristic system, con-
siderable dependence on foreign trade, and state-dominated political
philosophies, have tended to convert the multi-national corporations
under their aegis into direct-action implements for nationalistic eco-
nomic and military dominaton. 1 The British and the Dutch, with
their overwhelming interest in international trade, long colonial his-
tory, and preoccupation with stabilizing their financial security,8"
have quite understandably promoted a working collaboration between
their multi-national corporations and the home government which
affords these corporations substantial support
8  1
The incongruity between the objectives of the national state and
the international combine, and the superior effectiveness of the latter
institution, is primarily the result of a new set of political factors
which have upset the hitherto prevailing harmony (or at least lack of
too troublesome incompatibility) between international commercial
transactions and the lex mercatoria that governs them. The rise of
nationalism, with its accompanying dogma of sovereignty, infused
into the law a strong current of territorial limitation and locally
divergent political interests that was inconsistent with the growing
interdependence and integration of the international economic com-
munity.
In this lack of correlation between separatist national systems of
law and an integrated international economic system, the ultimate
loser was not the international economic system. In areas where
national law had incomplete coverage, the international business com-
munity was able, almost without design, to take advantage of gaps
and discrepancies; for the most part, however, the international com-
munity dispensed with governmentally accredited systems of law and
adopted privately agreed-on codes of business conduct and perform-
not give a proper picture of the qualitative importance of that trade to the American
economic system. R6PKE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION 30, 31, 33
(1942).
31. Cf. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE 621 (i92o), which says that British car-
tels were less under influence of military discipline than German cartels.
32. See COLIN CLARK, THE CONDrrIoNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESs (1940); KAHN,
GREAT BRITAIN IN THE WORLD EcONOMY (946).
33. It remains to be seen how far the British Labor Party regime will reverse
this trend. Despite the hostile attitude of Herbert Morrison towards cartels (see The
Economist, July 31, 1943), the British Trade Union Congress has taken the view that
industrial combination is inevitable but that the state should supervise and regulate
industrial combinations, with the ultimate socialist end in view of nationalization.
All the generalizations in this paper are necessarily imperfect, subject to contra-
diction in specific cases, capable of qualification probably in all cases. Any boastful
chauvinist reflections, based on the last paragraph, therefore, should disappear in the
face of their obviously statistical and approximative nature. Corporate organization re-
mains in large measure a personalized and feudal framework conducive to a high degree
of fortuitous movement and voluntary deviation.
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ance. The real loser was the national state. First the nationalist
state discovered that its possession of political and legal sovereignty
was insufficient to keep under its control instrumentalities of business
which were so largely operating outside its boundaries. Subse-
quently, it found its theoretical position of dominance and stability
subtly undermined by the insinuating and persistent pressures of in-
tegrated business units addressing themselves to the practical and
selfish necessities of international trade.
This was not the situation in the medieval or pre-nationalist
period. That period was largely one of individualized sale and bar-
ter transactions, consummated in specific locales, with the principal
parties to the transaction more or less directly confronting each other.
Since trade interchanges between remote places was only an inci-
dental feature of the feudal pattern and was free from the land basis
that so largely grounded feudal relations, traders were able to select
special trade enclaves within existing feudal boundaries and institu-
tions, acquire special immunities for those enclaves, and apply to the
transactions carried on within those enclaves those selective com-
pounds of business usage, reminiscences of Roman law, and concepts
of natural justice, that constitute the law merchant and the codes of
admiralty. Who would say these merchants nay, particularly if they
could help fill the coffers of their neighboring feudal lords?
The emergence of strong national states bent on careers of
colonial exploitation naturally changed the patterns of international
trade. Specifically authorized joint ventures yielded to more per-
manent joint stock and trading companies. These companies were the
consciously appointed ambassadors of the foreign economic and diplo-
matic policy of their national sovereigns, although they doubtless
frequently astonished the home authorities by the zeal, irregularity
and latitude with which they executed their missions. Doing busi--
ness in economically under-developed and legally less sophisticated
areas, with the sanction of superior physical power, these companies
encountered no legal factors which got in the way of their national
allegiance and conformity to their own national interest, although any
entity given such a large delegation of power necessarily obtained con-
siderable opportunity for self-exploitation. Any conflicts between dif-
ferent systems of national law were but minor (albeit direct) corollaries
of the larger clash between national states contending, under a mercan-
tilist system, for political and economic power.
Gradually traders abroad transformed themselves from mere
instruments of the national state into the main protagonists of inter-
national commerce, using the national state, if they had any occasion
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for it at all, as their instrument. The dynastic state, with its eye so
largely on political prestige, was gradually supplanted, in varying
degrees in different places, by the modern welfare state with its in-
creased diversity of interests and consequent inability adequately to
supervise those manifold interests. Passive and submissive "under-
developed" areas developed more active symptoms of nationalism and
economic ambitiousness. The international division of labor became
more of an international necessity and involved increasing conten-
tiousness among the industrial and trading governmental Dowers and
their private trade emissaries. International traders increasingly felt
the necessity for order in their own commercial operations, and for
an organized basis both of waging commercial war on competitors and
of arriving at commercial treaties with them. The handling of these
new necessities required a form of economic organization that would
promote a security and stability in the commercial arena comparable
to that achieved in the political realm. It was discovered that only
a well organized and routinely accepted political state could insure
internal order and provide the basis for external war and diplomacy.
The discovery is not as yet verbally articulated, but it is being
demonstrated in business practice that any unit desiring to achieve
the same objectives in the economic arena does well to assume the pro-
portions of an "economic state." The international combine is-such
an economic state, possessing an internationally integrated and regu-
larized system of operation, but in no way cribbed, cabined and con-
fined by territorial boundaries.
The only official law available to govern the operation of these
international economic states (and for that matter international trade
in general) remains, however, national law. That law is largely inef-
fective beyond the territorial boundaries of the national state and in
consequence doomed to frustration and defeat in any effort to make the
activities of the international trader conform to his sovereign's best
interests. No more than the legal system of the feudal chatelaine could
restrain or interfere with the activities of the merchant able to transfer
his trade activities elsewhere, no more than the corporation law of a
"sound" jurisdiction in our union can govern in what it conceives to be
the public interest an interstate corporation able to take advantage of
the laxity of the law of Delaware and New Jersey, is any one nation
really able to cope with the activities of an international combine. This
inapplicability of any official system of law does not imply the absence
of law in international trade; it merely means that the parties to inter-
national commercial transactions by and large apply.a private and reli-
able law of their own, which assumes the varying contours of codified
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business usage arbitration, standard form contracts,33a the selection of
"appropriate" legal rules, the manipulation of conflict of laws criteria,
not to mention the theme of his article-the internally binding law of
the corporation.
It is not the purpose of this article to embroider this brief histor-
ical sketch. Rather the remainder of this article will deal with condi-
tions as they now exist and will discuss the current disparity between
the effectiveness of the national state and of the international combine.
That disparity, and the reason why international combines do not pos-
sess the personal allegiance and amenability to state control which we
expect of individual nationals, can be reduced to four major propo-
sitions :
(i) As a legal matter, the scattered geographic nature of
the contacts -and activities of international combines enables them
to make a deliberate choice of forums and legal devices most suited
to their objectives. The regulatory power of national states, on
the other hand, is strait-jacketed by legal systems of restricted
scope and flexibility.
(2) On the economic side, international companies are no
longer the expression of a mercantilistic philosophy (i. e., that all
they do is for the benefit of their sponsoring sovereign) and of an
exclusively mercantile orientation. They have become an expres-
sion of a process of vertical economic integration affecting all
phases of production as well as marketing, that is based primarily
on economic considerations and only incidentally related to politi-
cal ones.
(3) On the administrative side, the corporation is endowed
with more limited and hence more precise functions and organi-
zation than the state. Consequently it can be more effective and
can be manipulated more readily than the democratic state, which
is an unclearly organized tug-of-war between all sorts of conflict-
ing pressure groups and forces trying to push it in various direc-
tions.
8 4
(4) As a matter of logical analysis, corporate personality
does not represent a single logical fiction, but is an accretion of
many fictions, the number, scope, applicability and maneuverabil-
33a. These three are major subdivisions of what is most appropriately called "droit
Corporatif." See del Marmol, Le Droit Corporatif de La Vente Commerciale, 63
REVUE DR DRolr INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION ComPAREE 6oi (936).
34. This generalization has to be modified somewhat for the totalitarian states,
which have a more unified political drive and animus than the democratic ones and have
been run by an opportunistically aligned gang of freebooters that usually includes some
members of the high corporate elite.
INTERNATIONAL COMBINES AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNS 589
ity of which can only be adequately appreciated by a highly skilled
technical expert fully aware of the fictive mechanism and of the
facts of the individual business enterprise. Government officials
have no opportunity to attain this exhaustive awareness.
England's dukedoms, marquisates, and like embodiments of polit-
ical power and social prestige were originally largely acquired by the
people in the community who could write-the "clerks" who were
proficient in literary symbols. In the same way, the great satrapies
and fiefs of modern economic life have largely been conquered by the
economically literate, the "financiers" with initiative and competence
in the field of corporate symbolism-and their employees. The mov-
ing rationales behind this development (an allegorical restatement of
the fourth proposition) have been dealt with by the author in a separate
article. 5 The first three propositions will be elaborated in the next
three sections of this article.
IV
Point Counterpoint-The Juridical Contrast
The relative impotence and immobility of the national state, and
the correlative vigor and maneuverability of the international combine,
can best be illustrated by a maritime analogy. Let us regard the
mass of public and private interests that a state is expected to protect as
a long, irregular, corrugated coastline. This coastline of socially ac-
ceptable interests is guarded by the state's legal system, which may be
likened to a coastal system of defense-a scattered and poorly coordi-
nated series of shore batteries dotting long sweeps of unprotected coast-
line. From time to time, the coastal defense launches some legal act
intended to protect an accredited interest; this, let us say, is a torpedo
ejected from the shore battery, a torpedo, however, of a make that can-
not submerge and can travel only near the surface of the water. The
international combine, on the other hand, can be compared to a subma-
rine, and those of the combine's actions which contravene national poli-
cies and interests may be regarded as analogous to the smuggling of
contraband by the corporate submarine. The legal torpedoes are
launched from fixed judicial and legislative moorings. While the tor-
pedoes may attain a certain amount of variation in course and speed,
legal radar has not yet given them the mobility that is possessed by
the corporate submarine, which can rely on all sorts of speedy turns
and diversions.
35. Timberg, Corporate Fictions, 46 CoL. L. REv. 533 (1946).
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Situations arise where an international combine desires to ward
off the impact of national policies opposed to its own course of action.
Like a submarine engaged in smuggling contraband and desirous of
avoiding legal gunfire, it has three main alternatives open to it. First,
relying on the length of the coastline (the multitude and variety of
the interests which the state must police) and the small number and
weak staffing of the coastal emplacements (government supervisory and
regulatory personnel), it can resort to economic harbors not policed by
the state, or rely on periods of time in which state surveillance is dor-
mant, for the overt and practically unconcealed fulfillment of its illicit
mission. Thus, for example, the combine may take advantage of the
fact that the only contractual situations likely to be litigated are those
where one of the contracting parties finds it advantageous to go back
on its contract. In the remainder of cases, where the combine and
its contractees live honorably up to their mutual intention of circum-
venting the laws or policies of a particular jurisdiction, public policy
can continue to be politely frustrated as long as the parties remain in
unlitigated agreement, and this is the characteristic state of the great
bulk of commercial transactions.
Second, if the international combine finds that it must pass through
economic channels that are well guarded by national coastal patrols, it
can conceal the true nature of its operations, i. e., submerge its business
maneuvers below the level of surface visibility. The inadequate extent
to which corporations disclose their policies, the failure of the account-
ing criteria underlying balance sheets and profit and loss statements to
supply an adequate basis for economic and social appraisal, and the
condensed nature of the data furnished stockholders in annual reports,
are indicative of what the corporation May do in this connection. An-
other illustration is the frequency with which basic constitutive (but
illegal) arrangements for an industry (e. g., division of industrial
fields and geographic areas) go under the decorative and innocuous
heading of patent license agreements or collective trademarks.
Finally, the corporate submarine can take advantage of its knowl-
edge that certain ports along the coast have a more complacent and
friendly attitude toward its activities than others.36 It frequently
happens in international business and trade that one national legal
system (one set of coastal guards) will regard the corporate submarine
as engaged in the transportation of entirely legitimate cargo, while
another legal system regards the cargo as contraband and the subma-
rine as a transgressor. In such cases, the corporate submarine will
propel itself towards the friendly legal harbor, i.e., a jurisdiction which
36. Venality has become a decreasing contingency in these matters.
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will apply favorable legal doctrine to the validation of the dubious
errand on which it is engaged. It is for this reason that combines
resort to the device of separate incorporation in foreign countries and
deliberately select the foreign jurisdiction in which they will execute
or perform contracts.
In fact, the submarine may gain more than passive toleration; it
may get positive aid from one sovereign in changing the attitude of
another sovereign jurisdiction originally hostile to its program. In
such circumstances, when the favoring jurisdiction comes to the aid of
the corporate submarine, it fortunately now, however, does so politely
and decorously by sending up a diplomatic flare, or firing _(or filing) a
purely formal political salvo (or protest). 3
The corporate submarine can also guide itself by knowledge of the
legal restrictions that limit the effective range of the coastal batteries.
While improvements in national law have made it possible to aim ef-
fectively at targets long distances away from shore, there will continue
to be jurisdictional limits to the effective range of legal gunfire, as long
as jurisdiction continues to be based so largely on territorial considera-
tions. Thus, effective relief extends only to parties within the jurisdic-
tion of the court or agency; it does not extend to the foreign natural or
artificial persons who financed or otherwise sponsored the bootlegging
conspiracy, if they have avoided the jurisdiction of the domestic court
and remain smugly within their foreign territorial confines.38 Or, even
where jurisdiction of the parties technically inheres in a tribunal, domes-
tic policy cannot touch transactions where too many acts and parties are
out of "contact" with the forum.3 9
Alternatively, the corporate submarine may seek to repel the
explosive torpedo fired against it or neutralize it into impotence by
37. Action of this type has become much more genteel since the British in 184o
sent warships out to induce the Sicilian government to revoke the sulphur monopoly
that it had granted (see 3 PiLL mp.E, INxTERNATIONAL LAW 35-37 (2d ed. 1873);
HEXNEI, op. cit. supra, note 9). Or even since the more recent days of Dollar Diplo-
macy and the German Imperial Government's active intervention in behalf of Mannes-
man interests in North Africa. See STALExY, RAW MATERIALS iN PEACE AND WAR,
172-3 (1937).
38. See United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S. D. N. Y.
1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C. C. A. 2d
1944) ; Oseas, Antitrust Prosecutions of Internatiol Business, 30 CoRN. L. Q. 42, 53
(1944) ; cf. DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U. S. 212 (1945).
In United States v. U. S. Alkali Export Ass'n (S. D. N. Y., decided July 17, 1946)
jurisdiction was sought over a New York subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., that was described by the I. C. I. people themselves as a "highly specialized
private commercial legation," yet it took an elaborate trial and opinion to dispose of
the contention that the corporation was not "found" in the Southern District of New
York for purposes of service of process.
39. See America Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (igog) ; but cf.
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U. S. 268 (1926).
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the use of a demagnetizing or de-gaussing composition or apparatus.
The manipulation of corporate nationality in the form of incorporation
abroad or the shifting location of directors, records, and main offices
in foreign lands is typical of this type of defensive tactic.
The predominance of the holding company set-up still further cam-
ouflages this defensive maneuver, by obscuring the significance and
locus of corporate nationality. On top of this, the financial domination
usually exercised by the controllers of a parent corporation over its
subsidiaries dilutes considerably the already attenuated "nationality"
of the corporate subsidiary. National states, however, particularly
where their vital defense or fiscal interests are involved, are increas-
ingly tending to launch the type of torpedoes that are not thus easily
rendered innocuous. The Anglo-American test of corporate national-
ity as determined by the place of incorporation, and the civil law cri-
terion of the center of administration of the company, have both been
recognized as too easily mutable.40  They are satisfactory primarily to
the corporators, who can dictate and speedily put into operation muta-
tions of corporate status, but of no advantage to the national state,
whose role is usually that of automatically registering the altered status
decided on by the corporators. 4 1  Furthermore, not only easy mutabil-
ity, but insubstantiality, has been advanced as an objection to both
the commercial and civil law nationality tests.
42
4o. The practice of multiple incorporation is one of the refinements of American
corporate law. Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation, and the Conflict of .Laws,
42 HARv. L. REV. 516 (x929). Cases are known where the corporation has been
authorized to do business in every state except the state of its incorporation. Likewise,
the ease with which the siege sociale of large European corporations was transferred
beyond the Channel and the Atlantic is illustrated by the story of the corporations-in-
exile during the war that has just ended. See Note, Corporations in Exile, 43 CoL. L.
REv. 364 (1943).
41. The concept of corporate nationality has become progressively denatured and
ever more closely approximates the notion of corporate domicile. Its elimination from
the domain of international law in the case of artificial persons has been urged with
increasing persistence. See NussBAuM, op. cit. supra. note 6 at 146-7; Hamilton, supra
note 6; Feilchenfeld, Foreign Corporations and International Public Law, 8 J. Comp.
LEG. & INT'L. L. 8i, 86-7 (1926).
Dissatisfaction with the accepted tests of nationality is further evidenced by alter-
native tests that have been advanced by legal writers but which have found little
judicial acceptance, such as the place of principal exploitation of the enterprise and
of the nationality of the corporate stockholders. In cases involving a determination of
enemy character, however, the latter test, although repudiated after the last World War
(see Hamburg-American Line Terminal and Navigation Co. v. United States, 277
U. S. 138 (1928), has recently received more encouragement See Hanna, Nationality
and War Claims, 45 CoL. L. REV. 301, 329 et seq. (945). This has probably been on
the theory that majority stock control was evidence that the persons in de facto con-
trol of the corporation (i. e., its directors) were enemies. Cf. McNAiR, LEGAL EFFECTS
OF WAR, 63-5 (i944).
42. It can be said of corporate nationality, as was said of corporate domicile a
long time ago, that the corporation may well find itself without a nationality or a
dwelling "either in its office, its warehouses, its depots or its ships. Its domicile is the
legal jurisdiction of its origin irrespective of the residence of its officers or the place
where its business is transacted." See Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 2o8 (i866).
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The corporate submarine these days relies not so much on direct
alliance with the shore forces or on its internal structure and equipment,
but on position and maneuverability. For these latter purposes, the
intelligence staff of the corporate submarine (its lawyers) can use
maps and charts that will insure the submarine's entry into a safe legal
harbor (i.e., deprive a hostile forum of jurisdiction over its activities)
and ballistic and 'tidal tables that will enable the submarine to anticipate
the social torpedo's course and escape its lethal effects (i. e., deprive
adverse legal systems of applicability). The basic data for these charts
and tables are the conflict of laws doctrines determinative of which
courts shall exercise jurisdiction over, and what national law shall be
applied to, a transaction.
In international economic affairs, two or more national jurisdic-
tions frequently compete in the regulation of corporate rights and rela-
tionships and are in a position to create differing rights and obliga-
tions for a corporation..43  An intelligent and objective corporate man-
agement presumably, therefore, tries to bring any question of the valid-
ity of its activities before the court or other governmental organ most
likely to acquiesce in its desires, or to impose on it more lenient obliga-
tions, or to interpolate into the controversy a substantive law or public
policy favorable to the corporation's objectives. In the corporation's
favor in this endeavor is the fact that it has specific dynamic aims to
achieve, whereas the national state tends to apply its law in a routine
and somewhat purposeless way.
Not only will resourceful legal staffs thus attempt to bring their
cases before benign courts, but they will attempt to condition their
transactions in such a way that even an unfriendly court will be legally
bound to decide in favor of their clients. In this endeavor they can
rely on the highly artificial nature of the judicial handling of interstate
or international disputes. Before a tribunal can face the issue of what
rule of law will be appropriate for it to apply to a given state of interna-
tional economic facts, it must answer the following large and confused
question: (a) What jurisdiction, among the several impinged on by
the transaction, has the right to have its substantive rules of law ap-
plied? " Since the answer to that question is in turn frequently de-
pendent on the legal "characterization" or nomenclature given various
aspects of the subject matter of the specific dispute, a second series of
involved questions then arises: (b) Is "real" or "personal" property
involved? Are the "internal affairs" of a corporation the point at
43. See Sohn, New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Problems, 55 HAiv. L.
RFv. 978, 979 (i942).
44. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problen, 47 HAzv. L. REv. 173
(1933).
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issue? Is a "penal" law being applied? Is the share of stock sued on
a "contract" or a piece of "personal property"? 45 Finally a third
series of questions is raised by the general notion that, while a court
should not apply its domestic substantive legal policies where another
state properly has jurisdiction over a controversy, it should not, on
the other hand, deviate from its usual procedures and remedies but
should uniformly apply its own procedural and remedial law. This
raises a most dialectical issue: (c) What is "procedure" and "remedy",
as opposed to "substance"? -6
Only after the combine lawyers and their adversaries have thus
played around with the conceptual counters inherent in the law of con-
flicts is the court ready to face the substantive issues that would arise
at the outset in an ordinary uncomplicated domestic case. Unless the
court decides that conflicts principles dictate that it follow the law of its
own state, or that the issue is a remedial or procedural one, it must
blindly follow the law of a foreign jurisdiction, unless it decides that
its public policy is fundamentally violated, which is a rare and diffi-
cult determination for it to make. The rarity and the difficulty arise
from two factors-the lack of technical criteria for evaluating public
policy (as contrasted with the abundance of criteria for playing the
conflicts game), and a commendable humility on the part of judges that
convinces them that they are in most cases not equipped to formulate
public policy.
Without entering into the legal gymnastics involved in the third
series of questions, let us get a very general view of the confusion cre-
ated by the first and second series in the case of an international com-
bine. It is in the nature of heroic over-simplification to point out that
alternative and non-synchronized conflict of laws rules attach differing
legal consequences to: (i) the situs of the physical properties of the
combine; (2) the places of execution, performance, and "other centers
of gravity" of contracts entered into by the combine; (3) the location
of the combine's directors, officers and records.
45. Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 CoRN. L. Q.
570 (1936) ; BATY, POLAmZED LAW 81, 86 (1914).
46. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.
J. 333 (1933); McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict
of Laws, 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 933 (1930) ; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,
326 U. S. 99 (945) ; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U. S. I (1941) ; Klaxon Com-
pany v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company, Inc., 313 U. S. 487 (194I). Two
pertinent paradoxes are raised by the "substance-procedure" dichotomy:
(I) a court will usually follow the law of its own state on less important (i. e.,
procedural and remedial) matters and discard it on more important (i. e., sub-
stantive) matters;
(2) the court will take no account of the fact that on occasion a decision on "pro-
cedure" is more significant than, in fact may even vitiate, a decision of "sub-
stance."
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The physical base of an international combine, its so-called operat-
ing properties, consists of mines, plantations and other natural re-
sources owned by it; refining, processing and fabricating mills, plants
and other facilities; rail, ship and vehicular modes of transport; stocks
and warehouses; and the manifold physical adjuncts of marketing and
distribution. The way in which these properties are operated, nay
their mere existence, affects the welfare of local labor and management
forces, the fiscal interests of local government, and the standard of liv-
ing of local communities. Consequently, the jurisdictions in which
these properties are located feel justified in relying on their police
power and in pressing for the application of the traditional doctrine that
the law and policies of the state of the situs of property should govern
the operation and disposition of such property. This simple territorial
assumption, however, need not settle anything which assiduous counsel
do not wish it to settle. Lawyers can manage to conceal physical prop-
erties from judicial view by interposing assets of an intangible nature,
pieces of paper, and other contractual interests only halfway on the road
to hardening into property interests (such as government concessions,
stock interests, patent licenses, rights of way, easements, etc.), which
require different legal treatment. Further complexities are raised by
the various legal consequences attendant upon the determination that
the property is "personal" or "real", the problem of giving the correct
legal localization to properties whose major commercial raison d'etre
arises from the fact that they are employed in a larger corporate
context, etc.
More importantly, however, the physical properties of a combine
are lifeless unless set in motion by a host of specific contracts and agree-
ments entered into with suppliers of raw materials and component
parts, vendees, brokers and other middlemen, shippers, workers, and
competitors. It is here that legal divergence and confusion are at their
apex, for the law of contract, the essential content of the commercial
law, is a body of legal doctrine much more pliable and ambivalent than
any dependent on the situs of property.
Where international combines are involved, their contracts will
frequently involve as principals the residents of several national juris-
dictions, and will set in motion a course of business operations taking
place in several jurisdictions. In such situations, the combine has con-
siderable power of choice and manipulation as to which national law
is to govern any particular contract. 47 It can, for example, follow the
doctrine that-the express intention of the parties decides what law is
47. For an analysis of the various tests governing the intrinsic validity of contracts,
see CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS, 347 if. (1942);
Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REv. 194 (1909).
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to govern the validity of a contract.48  This is, of course, carte blanche
to a clear-headed and purposeful corporate management, particularly
in dealing with weaker rivals whose feeble "intent" can readily be re-
moved from the transaction. Also, the criticism has validly been made
of this doctrine that it involves a "delegation of sovereign power to
private individuals" and "practically makes a legislative body of any
two persons who choose to get together and contract." 41 Applied to
transactions involving international combines, such a comment points
to an unaccountability in a business combine similar to that which in
theory should characterize only a political sovereign. While the intent
rule may operate satisfactorily where only private interests are involved,
it contains no guarantee that public interests will be adequately safe-
guarded,50 for it is all too frequently precisely the lawfulness of that in-
tent which is at issue.5'
The governing law for the validity of a contract favored by the
Restatement and most American critics, the law of the place of contract-
ing, sometimes results in sheerly fortuitous selection, sometimes can
be so readily manipulated by the parties that it becomes legal mumbo-
jumbo for the law that was in fact intended by the parties.52 On the
other hand, the so-called dominant English rule, the "proper law" test,
calling for the application of the law of the jurisdiction with the most
48. Mainly adhered to by English, European and Latin-American Courts. This view
has been approved by Professor Cook, provided the intent is explicitly expressed; there
are substantial contacts with the state intehded by the parties; and the law of the state
intended by the parties is not against the public policy of the forum of the place of con-
tracting. CooK, op. cit. supra, note 47 at 410, 418-9. Landmark cases in which the
intention of the parties was upheld despite the fact that the law intended was that of a
jurisdiction with only an ephemeral connection with the transaction are Gilbert v.
Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 7o6 (1931) ; Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus
Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277, 289-90.
49. See Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE
L. J. 655, 658 (1921) ; BEALE, TREATrsE Ox THE CONFLICr OF LAws § 332.20 (1935).
5o. The protection of public interests is extremely difficult in private litigation,
where they are rarely effectively raised or clearly presented. See p. 616 infra.
51. See Cavers, supra, note 44 at 185; BArY, op. cit. spra, note 45 at 45 et seq.
52. For example, the rule that a contract is executed by the last operative act in
its formation is subject to all sorts of stage management in an age where contracts
are consummated by mail or cable rather than by the handshakes of the parties. The
courts have, therefore, tended to pay less and less attention to the place of actual exe-
cution of a contract as a conflicts criterion. See Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S.
313 (I943) ; Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U. S. 357 (1918) ; Cheatham, supra, note 45 at 570, 586; Neuner, Policy Consid-
erations and Conflicts of Law, 2o CANADIAN BAR REV. 479, 490 (1942) ; Heilman,
Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43 YALE L. J. 1082,
1092 01934).
In DeBeers Consolidated Mines v. United States, 325'U. S. 212 (I945), an affi-
davit submitted by counsel for the United States recited that the defendants had tried
to avoid the jurisdiction of United States courts by making sales abroad only and re-
quiring purchasers to pay in advance for all purchases. See Lockwood and Scbmeisser,
Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade, ii LAw AND CONTEMP. PRoB.
663, 672 (1946).
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substantial and vital contacts with the transaction 53 has much to
commend it. However, care must be taken to see to it that substan-
tiality and vitality are predicated not on the formal legal criteria of
the law of contracts or conflicts, but on the proper evaluation of the
social, as well as private, interests involved. 4 Even tests involving
less leeway than those already mentioned, which are applied in more
limited situations, such as the application of the law of the place of
performance of the contract, or the law of the "center of gravity" of
a contract, 5 contribute an atmosphere of indeterminacy from which
the international combine, with its trained intelligence staff, usually
profits. a
Corporate domicile has also been invoked as the litmus test for
the appropriate forum or governing law in issues involving the inter-
nal affairs of the corporation. While the so-called internal affairs of a
corporation involve such ostensibly procedural matters as the powers
and constitution of boards of directors and corporate officers, the hold-
ing of corporate meetings, and the rights and privileges of stockholders,
these matters frequently have a serious and substantive bearing on
the economics of the corporation and its underlying property and con-
tractual relationships. Some evidence of this serious bearing is to be
found in the extent to which multi-national corporations have made use
of Switzerland, Liechtenstein and similar international Delawares as a
place of incorporation for their constituent business units.56
53. WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (7th ed., Bentwich, 1925);
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 254-6 (2d ed. 1938). Where the contacts
with two jurisdictions seem to be equally significant, this school will tend to apply the
law of the place of contracting.
54. This view also comes close to that suggested by Cook in his classic work. See
CooK, op. cit. supra, note 47 at 431.
55. E. g., the corporate domicile usually supplies the governing law in any con-
tracts between stockholders and their corporation; the state in which a stock or produce
exchange is located will govern transactions taking place on those exchanges; and the
law of the situs of the property will govern contracts affecting real property. Nuss-
DAUMf, op. cit. supra, note 6 at 171.
55a. Typical of the fluidity and amorphousness of the concepts that make up this
field are the propositions laid down in Wolff, Choice of Law by the Parties in Inter-
national Contracts, 49 JuRID. REy. iio (1947). According to Wolff, the parties are
permitted, by their own "intention," to select the "seat" or "center of gravity" of a
contract from "any system of law with which it is internally connected," and thereby
determine "the proper law" of the contract. However, even if the parties choose a sys-
tem of law with which the contract has no connection, i. e., do not choose a proper law,
the law selected will govern unless it contravenes any of the "compulsory provisions
of the true proper law." The situation is further confused by the fact, that there may
be several proper laws.
56. Compare the amusing description of the way in which the Viking marauding
expeditions of the loth Century "put an end to headlong competition in the trade,"
and tried to place themselves "above the accidents of national politics." As in the case
of modern corporations, "it was necessary to find a neutral ground on which to estab-
lish the home office of the concern. Such a medieval-Scandinavian New Jersey was
the Wendish kingdom at the south of the Baltic." VEBLEN, An Early Experiment in
Trusts in THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION 497, 505-6 (1919) ; also
available in 12 J. OF POL. ECON. 270 (1904). See also Archawski, Switzerland, Mother
of Cartels, 187 HAR1'ER'S MAG. 304 (Sept. 1943).
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While the combine is able thus to create legally determinative
"facts" and can subsequently select and manipulate them, the national
state has much more restricted powers of creation and selection. The
law, it is true, is historically established by the legislative and judi-
cial organs of the state. However, as has been seen, the plurality
and the territoriality of legal systems converts law into an arsenal of
legal weapons serviceable mainly to private parties rather than to the
state.
The state in theory has a few general legal doctrines at its dis-
posal that are not available to private persons like combines. They are,
however, negative in nature and limited in application. Thus, for ex-
ample, the state refuses to lend itself to the validation of private objec-
tives not directly or appropriately enough linked to its sphere of legally
acceptable interests by asserting that it lacks jurisdiction over the con-
troversy. Nevertheless, in practice, lack of jurisdiction is rarely raised
unless one of the parties raises it, and both sides in a private dispute
will frequently agree that a certain forum has jurisdiction, in order to
avoid the consequences that would attach if some other, possibly more
directly connected, jurisdiction were to become the forum.'7 Theoreti-
cally, also, courts may say that a corporate activity sought to be val-
idated is so counter to the public policy of the forum that they cannot
validate or give effect to that activity. For the public policy test to be
applied, however, there must be an outright and unequivocal repugnance,
not mere contrariety, between the corporation's activity and the policy
of the forum. Thus, even where doctrines of apparent advantage to
the state are concerned, they all too frequently, in the language of a
learned critic, constitute potentialities .ather than realities. 58
V
Current Tides in Economic Affairs
An increasing international division of labor has geographically
scattered the physical operations and commercial transactions of mod-
ern economic society and caused them to impinge on many different
national jurisdictions. On the other hand, economic necessity has
caused these activities to come increasingly under a single directional
roof. The procedure whereby the individual processes of raw mate-
rial extraction and supply, intermediate and final fabrication, and ancil-
lary and ultimate distribution and transportation, have become the
function of administrative departments of a single enterprise, rather
57. See Kronstein, Businss Arbitration-Instrunent of Private Government, 54
YALE L. J. 36 (1944); note 48 supra.
58. See NusSBAUM, op. cit. supra, note 6 at 143.
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than the independent activities of numerous separate business con-
cerns, has been called integration.
Vertical integration on the international scale is the result of
several factors. For one thing, business management has become in-
creasingly aware of the international contagiousness of prosperity and
depression; it recognizes the necessity, in order effectively to insure
against the bumps and troughs of the. business cycle, of controlling both
markets and raw material supplies that may be spread over many coun-
tries. In some fields, notably the chemical and synthetic industries, pat-
ents and scientific research have created "squeezes" of a more constric-
tive and permanent type than conventional international commodity
monopolists or speculators could have contrived; the combine absorbs
the process together with the entire productive plant built around it
and thereby degrades originally independent industrial competitors to
the status of financial servants. In addition, the need of industries
for new capital, and the drive of accumulated capital for new invest-
ment, has tended to subject larger and larger segments of industry to
a single financial direction. This has largely occurred not for valid tech-
nological reasons, but because of the natural tendency of surpluses to fill
up vacuums 30 and because of non-economic prestige motives on the
part of financiers of a type not too distantly related to successful stamp
collectors. Then, perhaps more contributory to horizontal than to ver-
tical integration is the fact that an expanding technology is producing
more and more products that can be commercially substituted for each
other and has contrived ever more exalted uses for originally neg-
lected industrial by-products."1
The modern multi-national corporation accordingly diverges dras-
tically in economic pattern from its legal progenitor, the trading com-
pany, regulated or joint-stock, of the 17th and i8th Centuries. The
59. E. A. G. ROBINsoN, THE STRucruRE OF COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY 126-131 (1932).
The term "administrative department" is here used in a lay and not a legal sense. De-
spite Western Electric's distinct corporate status, the Supreme Court, for example, has
had no difficulty in describing it as the manufacturing department of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Smith v. Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133,
151 (1930).
6o. Falling within this category is the phenomenon of internal financing, i. e., the
tendency of large corporations to meet all of their new financing needs from their own
capital surpluses.
6r. Thus, I. G. Farben, Du Pont and Imperial Chemicals have reduced production
costs (to themselves) and eliminated the insecurity of competition by constantly pro-
ducing innumerable new items; International Nickel and the copper Big Three will
not, unless extraction costs are prohibitive, neglect the cobalt, silver, lead and other
minerals and metals present in their nickel and copper ore deposits. 40 per cent. of
duPont's 1940 income was said to come from products not even manufactured by it six
years before. Currently, industry is shifting from a purchasing and marketing technique
which stresses physical and chemical composition (e. g., wires consisting of 98 per cent.
pure copper) to one involving use specifications (e. g., wires having certain tension,
malleability, or conductivity coefficients). This shift will serve to make the reign of the
large international combines more secure than ever.
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function of the trading company was to reap profits on mercantile ven-
tures in the literal sense-imports and exports. Th6 cultivation or
extraction of raw materials was the job of residents of overseas colo-
nies or foreign nations; the further fabrication of those materials and
ultimate sale of the fabricated products one for the entrepreneurs of the
home country. Broad governmental powers and facilities were given
the venturers, but theirs was nevertheless a simple segment of the in-
ternational division of labor, the procurement of fish, furs or min-
erals in exchange for the products of the home country.
62
The increasing international interdependence of business activity
has changed all that; the compartmentalized nature of the mercantile
pattern has been recognized as both too unprofitable and too precari-
ous. 63 Contractual relationships, whether they be of a vendor-vendee
nature or involve commitments of potential competitors not to compete,
are considered too subject to change and abrogation, as one or the
other party sees a chance to press a temporary bargaining superiority
to immediate advantage. The solution was to adopt a close-knit form
of organization which, by the mere fact of its establishment, would
tend to congeal and regularize commercial transactions and put an end
to business fluctuations that had led to too much financial insecurity.
And so, whole segments of international trade and industry have
passed, to reverse Maine's at best wishful generalization, from the
realm of contract and free-wheeling to that of corporate status and
regularity. 4  This transition was aided by legislative liberalization
and broadening of permissible corporate purposes, which in earlier cor-
porate authorizations had been specifically and narrowly defined. 5 It
was further spurred on by the discovery that the close-knit corporation,
by exploiting a spurious legal similarity to natural single persons,
skated more readily than loosely-knit trade groups around legal inhibi-
tions, at least those of Anglo-American law.0 "
62. James Mill's three volume HiSTORY OF BaTisH I nIA (1817) (which is
largely a history of the East India Company) is full of dynastic vicissitudes and polit-
ical embroglios, but the few economic summaries contained in it are limited to tabula-
tions of imports and exports.
63. Even at the time of our Constitutional Convention, it was said that lack of in-
tegration of commercial activity made trade dearer to th& people. See letter to Thomas
Jefferson, cited in ERNST, THE ULTIMATE PoWER 146 (1937). The issue, however, is
still unsettled whether the economies of integration necessarily redound to the benefit of
the consuming public, or whether they are taken advantage of by the managers of the
integrated business.
64. While Maine's famous generalization purported to describe the general course
of legal history as he saw it, it seems more like a rationalization of an implicit belief in
the validity of laissez-faire.
65. See page 605 infra.
66. See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Amerdcan Column and Lumber Com-
pany v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 418-9 (1922); Handler, Industrial Mergers and
the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. Ray. i79 (1932).
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Thus, for example, tire manufacturers, anxious to avoid the repe-
tition of painful price squeezes by the owners of the rubber plantations
of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, acquired substantial
tracts of rubber land for cultivation and established new purchasing
agents abroad; companies like U. S. Rubber, Firestone and Dunlop
now control a considerable proportion of their own supply of crude
rubber. Or Anaconda, Kennecott and Phelps Dodge, anticipating com-
petition from lower cost copper ores outside of the United States, ac-
quired extensive mine properties in Chile and elsewhere. This is
known as backward integration. Backward integration may arise
out of a fear of having inadequate inventories and being charged ex-
orbitant prices by the people in control of raw supplies, fears usually
realized during boom periods, but it may also be the product of more
sanguine economic moods.
In the case of automobile, radio and telephone companies like
General Motors, N. V. Phillips and the International Telephone and
Telegraph Company, and the manufacturers of complex items of ma-
chinery and equipment like International Harvester, Singer Sewing
Machine, and Standard Radiator, however, the raw material factor is
not so important; these firms derive their revenues mainly from the
manufacture and sale of fabricated products. Consequently, they have
established operating and selling companies all over the world, so that
they will be assured of continuous outlets for their products. This is
known as forward integration, which is justified as a method of sur-
viving recurrent depression periods by annexing and conserving an
irreducible minimum of consumer purchasing power-but also involves
taking advantage of opportunities for "normal business growth."
Companies like Unilever, the great English fats and oils combine,
and Alcoa, the American aluminum titan, are examples of so-called
complete (backward and forward) integration. In addition to the cre-
ation and retention of standing .market outlets, they have been re-
lieved of the possibility of discontinuity of operation, financial embar-
rassment, or unwanted competition by acquiring the peanut oil and
bauxite of British West Africa and Surinam.
Because of the more abundant natural resources of the United
States, we have in predominant measure been able to achieve industrial
integration entirely within our national borders. This has not been
true of the more compactly situated entrepot powers, like the British
and Dutch, who must reach outside of their own boundaries to attain
a scale of integration that will keep their large scale enterprises secure
against the vicissitudes of the business cycle. Furthermore, for the
British and the Dutch, the conduct of foreign relations and the man-
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agement of colonial empire had originally been largely in the hands
of the trading companies, which were in effect "chosen instruments"
for exercising and aggrandizing public power and therefore received
ardent state backing; the later internationally integrated corporation
has become the beneficiary of that traditional political and diplomatic
support.67 The United States, on the other hand, was in a sense
founded on a basis of revolt against exploitation and victimization by
alien trading companies, and had no established tradition of state sup-
port to tide the new multi-national corporations over the general nega-
tivism of laissez-faire commercial policy. It is therefore understand-
able why powers like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, so
dependent for existence on foreign trade, should be inclined to give
their international corporations, the ostensible protagonists and sym-
bols of that trade, extensive political backing. While international cor-
porations supply only the fringe of the American national income and
standard of living, they were regarded as essential to the well being
of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
More recently a new factor has arisen which has served both to
spur on the process of vertical integration and to identify more closely
the interests of national states with the activities of multi-national cor-
porations. With the advance of modern industrial technology and its
unfortunate and inevitable alignment with the forces of war, the war-
making abilities of all states have been impaired by their inability to
control adequate supplies of critical and strategic materials. For se-
curity reasons, therefore, nations which are dependent on foreign im-
ports for the raw materials that go into industrial military 68 produc-
tion have lent stronger support to a process of economic integration
that will assure, to enterprises under their control, ample supplies of
such materials.
While the integration of international enterprises is mainly due
to financial and industrial considerations, economic, legal and technical
factors have greased the way. For one thing, the forms and procedures
of modern finance are international in character; banking operations do
not radically differ as between Tokyo and New York. Then there is
the legal lingua franca of corporation and commercial law; legal sys-
67. The early trading companies, in addition to asking for monopoly privileges.
exemptions from import and export laws, and remissions of customs duties, also asked
for the governmental powers of imposing taxes on their own members, deciding their
own disputes, and defending themselves against pirates and other enemies. In fact their
maintenance of fortifications and consular agents and their governmental functions were
the main reason for the continued existence of these companies when their economic
functions had ceased. See 8 HoLDswoRTHr, HISTORY OF ENGLISi LAw, 200 et seq.
(2d ed. 1937).
68. Modern conditions of warfare of course make the phrase "industrial military"
a redundancy.
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tems of all nations have, for example, made way for the parent-
subsidiary concept and recognize the binding nature of contractual obli-
gations. Patent, accounting and other technical procedures are com-
parable in different countries. A monopoly of know-how in limited
hands may bring about a degree of integration that no amount of
financial pressures and commercial quid pro quo could encompass.
The technical personnel that has mastery of the operations and pro-
cedures of modern international business is extremely mobile. Except
for political and cultural factors, therefore, there have been no basic
economic and legal impediments in the way of corporations becoming
integrated ,over the international as well as the national terrain.
It may be argued, however, that autarchic political and cultural
factors have brought about a degree of disintegration in the case of
multi-national corporations. Upon closer analysis, however, it will
be seen that this disintegration is a matter of legal conceptualism and
surface physical appearance rather than real evidence of economic dis-
unity. For example, unfriendly national tariff and restrictive exchange
policies have accelerated the formation of national corporate units that
will have political viability as "domestic" employers of labor and "do-
mestic" taxpayers.69  As a concession to nationalistic trends, interna-
tional combines have undergone the formality of local incorporation,
put local residents on their boards of directors, and endeavored to give
as large a measure of employment as possible to local workers.70  There
has been an increasing tendency to solicit the investment of local capital,
and to encourage local manufacture of components and local assem-
bly of fabricated products. 71 All of these concessions to political na-
tionalism, however, have not overthrown the primary allegiance of
these combines to their top direction, which, whatever else it is, is pri-
marily not a political entity. The corporate subsidiary remains assimi-
lated in its functioning to a branch office; 72 the corporation remains
an economically integrated unit.
VI
The Administrative Arts of Command and Obedience
As in the case of all fusions of men and institutions, generaliza-
tions concerning state and corporation must necessarily be in terms
69. LIEFMANN, CARTELS, CONCERNS AND TRUSTS 244, 265 (1925). It has been
recognized that industrially underdeveloped countries have a legitimate grievance at
mono-commodity exploitation which deprives them of integrated exploitation of their
resources. See Coudert and Lans, Direct Foreign Investment in Undeveloped Counl-
tries; Some Practical Problems, ii LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 741, 746. 748 (1946).
70. See Bonsai and Borges, Limitations Abroad on Enterprise and Property Acqui-
sition, ii LAW & CoNmTEp. PROB. 720, 727, 737-738 (1946) ; Coudert and Lans, supra
note 69, at 75o-751.
71. PLu mM , op. cit. mspra, note 7 at 52-53. Progressive domestication of capital
ownership has been urged. Coudert and Lans, supra note 69, at 754-755.
72. See LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 159-60 (1938).
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of probabilities rather than absolutes, and distinctions between the two
consequently become matters of degree, innuendo and approximation
rather than clear-cut and outright contradictions. 3  This is particu-
larly true with respect to the comparative administrative functioning
of the national state and the international combine. However, since
all matters of judgment depend on occasionally fallible generalizations
and on distinctions of color tones rather than primary colors, let us
plunge into the risky business of institutional generalization, having
forearmed ourselves with this apologia for error and deviation.
First of all, it should be noted that the international combine has
preempted for itself a more limited field of social activity than the
national state. To the combine, therefore, accrues the major advan-
tage inherent in specialization of function-a readier adaptation of
mechanism to purpose. There are moments when the corporation en-
croaches on objectives within the legitimate domain of the state, but
they are usually limited to urgent corporate business; they partake,
therefore, of the intensity of the corporation's basic purposes and the
efficiency of the corporation's implementing drives. As a matter of
internal administrative mechanics, the international combine is a
quicker, more flexible and hence usually more successful entity than the
national state. Although all large-scale bureaucratic organizations
have their inevitable confusions of purpose, the international combine
nevertheless has specific commercial objectives, e. g., the performance
of certain types of business activity, the maximization of profit, the as-
surance of financial security.' These, though broad, are more en-
compassable and explicit than the vaguely felt political and social
objectives of the modern state.
Where conflict arises, as it occasionally does, as to which spe-
cific corporate class interest or purpose is paramount, the corporate
organization presents, in the form of a board, committee, or respon-
sible official, a relatively compact and efficient mechanism for review
and reconciliation of the conflict. The "legislative" powers of the
stockholders, the "executive" role of the board of directors, and the
pressures exercised by outside groups such as creditors, labor and
consuming public, all have their moments of significance in the de-
termination of general corporate policy, but are necessarily impotent
abstractions as far as the bulk of specific corporate acts are concerned.
7 4
73. A system would appear to be doomed politically that relies exclusively on the
concept either of a "government of laws" or of a "government of men," and does not
attain a good admixture of both. Cf. HAPMNGTON, OCEANA; FRANK, IF MEN WERE
ANGELS, Ch. XII (1942).
74. See Kahn-Freund, Separation of Powers in Company Law, 7 MOD. L. REv. 73
(1944) for a discussion of a recent example of "executive" functions of the directors
being preserved from impairment by the "legislativ'e" acts of the stockholders.
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The legal powers of "control" over an enterprise that these groups
nominally possess are rarely exercised in practice. When exercised,
these powers usually involve the checking and approving of policies
initiated largely as routine matters by the corporate management,
rather than independent policy initiation or the performance of specific
acts. Thus both the day-to-day decisions and the long run policies
of the corporation tend to emanate from its executive and managerial
group. Within this group responsibility for corporate action may
vary, according to whether, for example, a specific price determina-
tion or an over-all financial decision is involved. The bulk of spe-
cific decisions, however, are usually speedily consummated within the
lower echelons of the corporate enterprise, without any necessity for
further review. Those decisions which determine the basic status of
the corporation within its economic community (i. e., financial de-
cisions as to major acquisitions of competitors and expansion of in-
ternal plant, and dividend and reinvestment policy; labor matters;
over-all legal and financial organization) tend to be centralized in the
chief executives of the firm. As for other important decisions not so
centralized, there is a reviewing and deciding focus within each cor-
poration-be that focus the vice president in charge of a specific func-
tion, a division superintendent, or some policy committee drawn from
the entire firm. 70
Business corporations are no longer restricted to the precise speci-
fications of powers and line of activity with which they first emerged
into history, but may cover all lines of business, grow to any possible
size, use by-laws to define their internal organization and other rights
as they please, and amend those by-laws without recourse to further
legislation or any other governmental intervention. What were at
one time outlawed ultra vires acts of corporations have acquired legal
approval; corporations, for example, have been given unlimited pow-
ers to purchase and guarantee the securities of other companies and to
act as holding companies.
Utilizing all these administrative advantages of unity of purpose,
speedy action, centralized responsibilities, and broad powers is an in-
tegrated group that possesses substantial financial resources, tech-
nical knowledge not easily obtainable by strangers, and staying power
and initiative not typical of governmentally constituted groups. In
75. A good analysis, based on many case studies, of how corporate decisions and
policies are reached is to be found in GoRoN, BusINEss LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE
CORPORATION (1945). For a description of the decentralized operation of the General
Motors Corporation and of the "objective tests" which are employed to check the
operations of a large business corporation, see DRucKEm, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION
(1946), especially pages 41-71. The reader should perhaps be warned that the ease
and plausibility which characterize some of Drucker's conclusions flow from the skillful
selection of his basic premises.
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short, the corporate management has all of the advantages of an
entrenched and disciplined minority at work among the somewhat
gangling and incoherent groupings that characterize modern political
systems.
The "sovereign" state which attempts to 'exercise a supervisory
or regulatory jurisdiction over the international combine has corre-
sponding infirmities. It is characterized by a multiplicity of purposes
and objectives of a political and social, general welfare and diplomatic,
character, which prevent it from giving needful single-minded atten-
tion to the protection of the national interest in the economic domain.
The combine, its consumers, and its rivals constitute a matrix of
opposed social and economic vectors and attractions that frequently
results in leaving governmental activity at dead center. This clash
of purposes (economic desiderata for society may run counter to basic
political principles, for example) is often not recognized.
Characteristically, moreover, the governmental mechanisms for
ironing out differences are either non-existent or clumsy in operation.
The determination of what constitutes the public interest, and the pres-
entation of data relevant to that determination, are the function of
groups with selfish interests and biased and partial views (trade asso-
ciations, labor groups, etc:). Not only does the state have to share
the oversight and regulation of commercial affairs with corporate man-
agement itself, the trade association or cartel to which the corporation
belongs, and outside labor and financial groups, but those groups are
able, unpredictably but at times powerfully, to determine governmental
policy over matters involving the corporation."6
Constitutional limitations, and a human diffidence that is under-
standable in matters as technical and altruistic as public administra-
tion, withdraw whole segments of corporate activity completely from
governmental scrutiny. The legislature, the courts, and one or more
administrative agencies all have spheres of interest in the laying down
of governmental policy, but those interests are sporadic, variable and
not well integrated with each other; jurisdictional questions and fears
arise in connection with them that are not readily ironed out and which
retard affirmative action. Governmeni regulation, in the few areas
where it exists, involves primarily the laying down of general policies
(rule-making, quasi-legislative conduct), and enforcement of those
policies is of necessity partial and irregular. Government regulation
which is not of a legislative and rule-making nature involves the review
of actions that have been initiated by the corporation and not the in-
76. See LASKI, FoUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 28, 219 (1921); CONDLIFFE, THE
RECONSTUCTON OF WorLD TRADE 33-34 (1940).
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itiation of positive action by the state itself; the state must wait for the
corporation to do something which rises to the level of administra-
tive cognizance.
Finally, the staff within government which is devoted to the task
of public supervision and regulation does not have the emoluments and
usually does not possess the mass of recorded and unrecorded tech-
nical knowledge possessed by a corporate management. In sum, and in
contrast to the corporation, the government as- an administrative entity
is characterized by diversity and clash of purpose, diffusion of respon-
sibilities, limited powers, largely passive functions, and limited knowl-
edge, coverage, and fiscal and intellectual resources.
The modern state has been likened to a body that has apoplexy
at the head and atrophy at the extremities. 7 The international com-
bine, on the other hand, preserves a rather good balance between ac-
tive central direction and peripheral movements; it converts the direct-
ing brain signals into answering reflexes and responses without too
much delay or equivocation.
The foregoing contrast between the supple and athletic corporate
sovereign and the lax and lumbering political sovereign may not appear
quite as striking in the case of a fascist or totalitarian economy, al-
though one can see a great deal of business self-government and state
inefficiency persisting in the day-to-day activities of German and Italian
business before the Nazi defeat. Presumably also, even in the case of
democracies, the concentration of a business corporation upon its com-
mercial objectives and its disassociation from or antagonism to the po-
litical and social objectives of the national state has been considerably
qualified of late, although the conformity of corporate policy to national
interest remains demonstrably defective. But the superior efficacy of
the corporation as a technique of administrative organization is evi-
denced by the constantly growing number and range of functions of
government corporations, and the increasing extent to which intergov-
ernmental corporations are displacing diplomatic concords and bodies
as devices for regulating the international economy.78
VII
The New Concert of Economic and Political
Powers-:the Possible and Probable
Thus, the modern democratic state, in its dealings with the inter-
national combine, is handicapped by a legal system that enables the
77. Lamennais, as quoted in DuGurr, LAW AND THE M0DERiq STATE, Ch. XV,
(1920).
78. The recent Russian plans for the economic development of Hungary and Ru-
mania have taken the form of government corporations with mixed Russian and local
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combine to out-maneuver it; territorial limitations that give the state
only a partial glimpse into, and an even more restricted supervision
over, the far-flung economic activities of the combine; a corporate
vocabulary and conceptualism that frequently becloud underlying
business purposes and realities; and a creaky and frequently confused
governmental administrative set-up. These factors make it impos-
sible to ascertain clearly what are the proper obligations of the cor-
poration to the state, and serve to impede the state in its enforcement
of even those corporate obligations that are more or less clear. Since
at least some of these corporate obligations are of a character ordi-
narily associated with the duties of a "national," it is evident why
there exists currently a tendency to dismiss nationality as a meaning-
less corporate attribute.79 National sovereignty, the juridical correl-
ative of that fleshless corporate nationality, likewise in this context
becomes a hollow phrase, devoid of substantive implications.
Is the situation actually this hopeless? Or can the concepts of
corporate nationality and national sovereignty be salvaged, and to
what extent? The answer will depend in part upon how we are able
to rework the legal, economic, analytic and administrative frames of
reference, just described, that conspire to reduce the concepts to nul-
lity in practice. Even if we decide to abandon the concepts, apprecia-
tion of the reasons for their uselessness may result in a more compre-
hensive and more refined social and analytical orientation towards
basis economic phenomena.
The comparative administrative inertia and confusion of the
modern state, which has been generally described in the preceding
section, can be mitigated, but this will necessarily be a slow and selec-
tive process. The problems that will be encountered are analogous to
the difficulties present when the government attempts to control its
natural citizens, and the democratic state's easy-going accommoda-
tion to these problems has thus far been rightly accepted as vastly
preferable to the legend of totalitarian efficiency and administrative
vigor. Nevertheless, greater administrative acumen, streamlining
and drive is possible and is needed within the state machinery if polit-
ical government is effectively to deal with strong rival economic
governments like international combines.
It is possible that a corporate setup which is properly delimited
as to scope, powers and obligations, and appropriately constituted as
to control and management, may function as a helpful adjunct to, nay
as a potent instrumentality of, the democratic national state and a
participation, and there has been considerable backing for the proposal that the heavy
industries of the Ruhr be run by internationally constituted corporations.
79. See note 41 supra.
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peaceful international community," This, however, calls for an ex-
tensive re-examination of hitherto more or less unquestioningly
accepted axioms and their consequences. A first step in this far-
sweeping revaluation is to take account of the totally different eco-
nomic character of small and large corporations, respectively; this is
something which has become increasingly obvious to careful observ-
ers of the economic scene but of which the doctrinaire legal system
has taken almost no account. 81
Next; it is desirable that international combines, their corporate
constituents, and their individual agents, be recognized as "subjects"
of international law, a notion to which, as has already been said, con-
ventional international law doctrine has been notoriously recalci-
trant.8 2  However, it is not sufficient to give combines and similar
economic units a direct representation in international law similar to
that possessed by national states. It is necessary as well to restate the
interests both of state and combine in international law-to recognize
that these interests are not of an "eternal and inalienable" character
different from and transcending those of individuals, but approximate
in nature those economic interests with which individuals and private
municipal law are concerned. 3 Such a revaluation should result in
increased recourse to private municipal law as a method of irrigating
the arid interstices that characterize so much of the potentially fertile
acres of international commercial law.8 4  In this connection, without
stirring up any phobias against corporations, there might well be
effectively revived a little of that salutary skepticism and distrust with
8o. The modern state, it is to be hoped, has advanced somewhat from the political
confusion of the era in which Hobbes wrote, when he described as an infirmity of a
commonwealth "the great number of Corporations which are as it were many lesser
Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrayles of a natural
man." LEVIATHAN, Ch. 177 (Everyman Lib. ed. 1931).
8r. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(932) ; RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 64, 66, 75 (927) ; Rutledge, Signifi-
cant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 305 (937).
82. See note 4 vnpra.
83. See LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. mtpra, note 5 at 48, 73.
84. Note that the Statute of the Permanent Court of International justice, Art.
38 (3), requires that court to apply "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." It is curious that it should be the international lawyers of common
law England and the United States who have so largely stressed Roman law as a source
of international law. See LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. mspra note 5 at 26, 29, 3o. Lauter-
pacht places the reason for this in the persistence in England of a natural law back-
ground, and the preoccupation of British practitioners of international law with admi-
ralty law, which is of Roman origin. The author is inclined to suggest-natural law
concepts surely did not disappear from the civil law continent of Europe-an implicit
conception of an economic pax Britannica under "liberal" auspices that paralleled the
earlier pax Romana. "Morality" and "law" as abstractions have an unhappy flexibil-
ity about them-they can either be harnessed to practical everyday economic dealings
and necessities or they can become the intellectual and almost religious tools of a
dynastic state, as was true of the German Hegelian tradition.
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which the states of this Union originally regarded the activities of
corporations, particularly those created in other states.85
Acceptance of the foregoing leads to a further conclusion, that
it is necessary to deal with the more important international combines
by the case method, an approach which is always cited as one of the
glories of the common law but has long (and, the author submits,
mistakenly) been abandoned in the field of Anglo-American corpora-
tion law.86 Adopting necessarily arbitrary criteria as to what con-
stitutes a "large" international combine, each large international com-
bine might, for example, be required to obtain a special charter of
incorporation to engage in international economic activity, after care-
ful scrutiny and acceptance by the chartering authority of its peculiar
economc circumstances and corporate policies. By-passing for the
time being the very troublesome question of who and whose agent
the chartering authority should be, new corporate acquisitions, trans-
fers, and other transformations of such combines taking place after
the issuance of the original charter might require similar approval.
This procedure would supplant the practice, now followed by the na-
tional states, of perfunctory issuance of general charters to whatever
corporate creations a controlling financial group sees fit to sponsor,
merely upon compliance with a few formal technicalities. It would
also give the chartering authority a chance to review the massive
accretions of financial power that may alter and enlarge their corpo-
rate dominion ten-fold without otherwise calling for official re-exam-
ination. Large international combines are in fact so few in number
as to make this procedure not too onerous a one, in view of the large
ends to be accomplished; after all, the more complete the economic
and social stock-taking involved in a governmental survey of du Pont
and U. S. Steel, for example, the more complete our assurance that
the world's chemical or steel industry is functioning within economic
and social bounds that we would regard as proper. Considering the
vast complexities of modern industrialism, a corporate charter must
to a large extent remain a hunting license, but it could at least be a
license to hunt in season and for specified game, and not one to poach
at will in the economic domain.
The standards which the chartering authority can use in apprais-
ing these corporate Titans are already in large measure suggested by
85. See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541
(1933) ; RiPLEY, op. cit. supra, note 8o at 22. Maitland states that American corpora-
tions have always lived in greater fear of the state than English corporations. See his
SELEC:Tm EssAYs (Hazeltine, Lapsley, and Winfield ed. 1936).
86. A special license from the executive arm is still required of corporations in
many countries of the world. See Eder, Some Restrictions Abroad Affecting Corpora.-
tions, ii LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 712, 714 (1946) ; Bonsai and Borges, supra note 7o,
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municipal law, and are being gradually developed through interna-
tional economic bodies and conferences. Safety, efficiency and other
standards have been developed, for example, in specialized fields like
aviation, telecommunications and fisheries; conservation and other
economic norms in connection with those commodities that are the
subject of international commodity agreements. S  The International
Labor Office has evolved detailed standards in the field of working
conditions and relations, and the proposals constituting the basis for
the incipient International Trade Organization are replete with sug-
gestions. s8 Perhaps the most acute lack in the way of available inter-
national standards are social norms for the functioning of the corpo-
rate mechanism itsdlf. However, this is merely a carry-over from a
similar deficiency in the domestic field, where non-lawyers are dis-
inclined to view the corporation as anything but a formal legal device,
and lawyers are perhaps too exclusively preoccupied with the fascina-
ting legal and literal ramifications of charters, minutes, certificates
and other corporate papers.
In addition to imposing obligations, norms, and negative restric-
tions on corporations, the grant of a charter could also serve to confer
on the combine legal standing and specific positive rights under inter-
national law. This has been suggested in the past,89 but, it is sub-
mitted, to the exclusion of a balancing emphasis on enforcing the cor-
relative duties of corporations. Here, what is needed is a more func-
tional handling of the corporate concept, so that the multi-national
corporation can act out in society its excellent philosophic status as a
"right-and-duty bearing unit." Sophistication and acuity of analysis
are required in order that creditors' rights, the government's revenue
needs, and the countless other nationally and internationally accred-
ited social and individual interests may be served and not impeded by
corporate activities. Here, as elsewhere, what is needed is not the
wholesale discarding of prior concepts and doctrines but their dis-
criminatory pruning, qualification, and analysis, in the light of the
interests that they should intellectually clarify and pragmatically
serve.
This program is sheer intellectual by-play, however, unless, when
we classify pertinent interests, we also determine whether a state of
this Union, a federal government, a form of international government
87. See references cited in Timberg, An International Trade Tribunal, 33 GEo. L.
J. 373, 393, 398-9 (1945).
88. See PRoPosALs FOR EXPANSION oF WoRLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT (U. S.
Dep't State 1945).
89. E. g., Feilchenfeld, supra, note 41 at 26o.
at 731. It is of course necessary that these special acts not be mere occasions for the
display of xenophobia.
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not yet formed, or some combination of these three, is their appropri-
ate governmental protector. That determination of appropriate spon-
sorship will in turn point to the appropriate authority (or joint au-
thorities) for the issuance of the proposed international charter.
Such a classification of germane interests, and their assignment to a
guardian government for protection, is a difficult and complicated
process; 90 only a few broad and approximative criteria can here be
suggested. A good starter would be to determine the territorial area
of the more or less direct impact of specific corporate activities. That
impact is both within, and external to, the corporate ambit.
It will be helpful, in evaluating the effect of corporate acts within
its internal organization, to think of the combine not as an undecom-
posable single entity, but as an amalgam of elements fused in practice
but separable in analysis and theory. Among these corporate elements
are the individuals forming the corporation, the classes of corporate
property, the corporate franchise, and the various corporate pur-
poses.91 What is mainly needed, however, is a transfusion, from the
comparatively virile veins of municipal law, of intellectual blood to
remedy the pernicious anemia of international law, e.g., a clearer
perspective of the divisibility and occasional contrariety of the various
corporate groups and purposes.
9 2
As to the external ramifications of corporate acts, the problem
is more difficult. This is because the consumers, creditors, vendors,
vendees and competitors of a combine have even less "subjective"
standing in international law than the combine itself. One rarely
thinks, for example, of their "nationality" as a legally significant
element in a transaction, although it is frequently a political factor of
considerable importance. On the whole, these economic classes
affected by the economic activities of the international combine are
remitted (like the mental and infantile incompetents who figure so
prominently in international law analogies) to the protection of the
go. This process of "appraising the Governmental interest of each jurisdiction"
involved is analogous to the procedure followed by the Supreme Court in our federal
system pursuant to both the full faith and credit and due process clauses. See Alaska
Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. of California, 294 U. S. 532 (1935) ;
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. i43 (i934).
It would, of course, be advantageous if international society possessed a judicial tri-
bunal which could perform for it what the Supreme Court has done in this country.
The history of the classification of respective state and federal interests in interstate
commerce that began with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. i85i),
has been magisterially recapitulated in such recent decisions as South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938) ; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S.
341 (1943) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (i945). See also Dow-
ling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rlv. I (1940).
9i. The writers on public and private international law, in describing the "con-
tacts" which are determinative of jurisdiction and controlling substantive law, have
broken ground in this connection.
92. See notes 83 and 84, supra; Timberg, supra, note 35 at 557-566.
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sovereign states, with their monopoly of international law "subjec-
tivity." 93 This, too, is an unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Once the territorial area of impact of a corporate activity is de-
termined, the jurisdiction or jurisdictions most nearly co-terminous
in area with the area of impact would, prima facie, be the appropri-
ate sponsor for any needed regulation of that activity, for it would be
the appropriate conservator of the interests to which that corporate
activity was directed or which it should be kept from impairing. For
those purposes, the combine would owe allegiance to the policy and
mores of that jurisdiction.
This is an abstract formulation, but specific illustration from our
experience in the United States may give it concreteness. Thus, for
example, the national impact of the labor and financial policies pur-
sued by large interstate corporations has led to repeated legislative
proposals for federal incorporation aimed at safeguarding the na-
tional interest in the labor and investment fields . 4  It has also
resulted in elaborate federal legislation with respect to labor, financial
organization, and social security.95 That federal legislation in turn
has had the collateral but important effects of protecting the standards
and policies of progressive states from disregard and attrition at the
hands of lower standards elsewhere, and of raising the standards of
the backward states; contrary to the Cassandras, both developments
are enhancements of, and not encroachments on, an effective state
sovereignty. 6 Ultimately, area by area, federal and state govern-
mental rivalry has, with the help of a guiding supreme tribunal,
been supplanted by a cooperative condominium of control.
To what extent does our domestic history supply guidance in
the international sphere? In the first place, it is more urgent that
effective controls over corporations be exercised in the international
than in the domestic field. The recent vast slaughter has indelibly
underscored the demoniac difference between the totalitarian states
and the democratic ones. We have learned from our fascist enemies
93. See notes 83 and 84, supra.
94. Urged by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 and President Taft in i91o.
For a fuller history of this proposal and the arguments pro and con, see Letter Con-
taining Compilation of Proposals and Views For and Against Federal Incorporation or
Licensing of Corporations, SEN. Doc. No. 92, Pt. 69a, 70th Cong., ist Sess. (934).
Full hearings were held on a measure introduced by Senator O'Mahoney in 1937 (S. 10
and S. 3072), which contains affirmative regulations and prohibitions with respect to
working conditions, corporate finance, management controls, and trade practices and
restraints. See Hearings Before Senate Committee on Judiciary on S. zo and S. 3072,
75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1937).
95. This is exclusive of regulations of specific industries such as packers and
stockyards, radio broadcasting, public utilities, aviation, etc. For a good statement of
the opposed contention that national sovereignty and international law are mutually
exclusive, see WILLIAMS, ASPECrS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 et seq. (1939).
96. See Timberg, supra, note 87 at 375-376, 400.
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the sinister results that come from a persistent and humorless eleva-
tion of duties above rights; that, where "the State is an organ of
Divinity, patriotism is a religion;" and that even behind the noble
Kantian categorical imperative lurks the Prussian drill sergeant.Y
7
War, which in the time of von Clausewitz had been even for dynastic
states merely a continuation of political intercourse by other means
and was confessedly directed to a political objective, had, by the time
of von Treitschke and Bernhardi, become for Germany an end in it-
self-the fulfillment and fructification of the national State. 8  In
a framework of war-like aggressiveness, where religion and ethics
have proven papier mach6, the corporate creatures of the dynastic
state have likewise become pliant instrumentalities of national aggres-
sion. A similar submissiveness has not been true of the corporations
centered in the more democratic states, which have retained a free-
wheeling approach that only rarely assumes the phase of opposition
to the state's objectives or of too open an involvement with govern-
mental machinery, but usually preserves an equable indifference to
political objectives. 99 It is therefore increasingly incumbent upon
the democratic states, when they confer privileges on powerful self-
governing business associations, to maintain some measure of sur-
veillance over the activities of their corporate creations.
The control of international economic operations raises not only
more dangers but also more difficulties than the control of domestic
activities. With the subsiding of the original "nationalism" of the
states of our Union, for example, those states no longer have violent
political feelings with respect to interstate corporations organized in
other states. There still remains an antagonism based on undesirable
economic and social trends for which these foreign corporations are
deemed responsible, such as the lowering of labor standards, the de-
frauding of domestic investors, the export of income and capital from
the state to absentee landlords resident elsewhere, the creation of un-
desirable social and esthetic conditions such as overcrowding and
smoke or the overthrow of an idealized economic pattern (e.g., the
transition from farm-owning yeomanry to tenants managing farm-
lands in behalf of alien insurance companies). These conflicts and
97. See DEWEY, GERmAN" PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 52, 57, 99 (1915).
98. See CLAUSEWITZ, Ox WAR 16 et seq., 594 et seq. (Modem Library ed. 1943);
LAUTERBACH, The German Idea of Military Society in STUDIES IN WAR 36-55 (Infan-
try Journal 1943).
99. It is true that there lurks in the ostensible subservience of some servants of
the modern state a certain element of leadership. Modern business is in some measure
the Admirable Crichton with which no nation at war can dispense, and this has been
true to some extent of a dynastic state like Germany. It is also true that the busi-
nessmen of democratic nations are patriotic when patriotism is clearly defined. Never-
theless, basic lines of differentiation exist between the totalitarian states and the 'democ-
racies.
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the irritations which they engender are, however, pale carbon copies
of the antagonisms which corporations centered in different nations
can arouse. In the first place, nations have the potentiality of waging
war, whereas the states of our Union do not. There is a relative
cultural and linguistic homogeneity among our states that promotes
social intercourse and freedom of economic communication, for which
no parallel exists on the international scene. There is also a greater
similarity of basic laws and institutions on the domestic scene, al-
though a unifying trend is discernible in international economic life.
The increasing industrial development of what were originally agrar-
ian states has served to render the corporations of one state more
acceptable to the citizens of another. Above all, the United States is
characterized by the restraining influence of a federal constitution
and federal legislative and judicial organs, which prevent the states
of the Union from developing either the economic autarchy so char-
acteristic of independent nations or the atomistic legal doctrines
usually implementing that autarchy. In sum, therefore, we have on
the international scene greater divergencies of public policy and
economic conditions; augmented risk of infraction of national policy;
increased necessity for, along with a greater difficulty of, reconciling
national policies with respect to large and potent corporations; and
a more urgent need for seeing to it, in times of war or other public
crisis, that the corporation conforms to national policies.
It should be noted that the preservation of national control and
national sovereignty over corporations does not preclude the use of
international mechanisms or norms. A large part of the activities of
an international combine does not concern vital national interests; the
basic purpose of corporate activity is usually irrelevant to such inter-
ests. Another large segment of the combine's activities takes place in
areas where national sovereignty is doomed to defeat, because any
one sovereign has incomplete coverage of the situation, and the com-
bines are consequently able to pick, from the lottery of municipal,
private and public international law norms, the most lax standard
which they can find.100 A corporation does not become a worse
citizen of the national state because it conforms to obligations of in-
ternational derivation or exacted by an international authority, par-
ticularly where those obligations could not have been effectively
imposed or enforced by the national state itself.
Sovereignty has always had the connotation of paramount
power. This is true regardless of whether it is given the meaning
assigned to it by the international lawyers, i.e., the predominance of
ioo. See pages 593 to 598, mtpra.
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the national state and its unanswerability both in its external and
internal relations (a largely negative and anarchic conception), or
the meaning used much earlier by apologists for a budding national-
ism like Bodin and Hobbes, i.e., the locus of absolute governing
power within the state (an essentially positive and unifying use of
the term). Anything therefore which detracts from that power or
cuts down on the possibility of its exercise ipso facto impairs national
sovereignty. No state can validly claim to be all-powerful if inter-
national combines are in a position to thwart and negate its laws
and policies. If national sovereignty is to have real meaning, the
national state must be in a position to exercise adequate powers of
review and coordination over the activities of corporate and other
groups operating within its borders. There is therefore considerable
merit, even as a device for the conservation of national sovereignty,
to the suggestion that charters of international incorporation be
issued by an international authority.101
The public policy issues raised by our international trade are too
vital, and too prone to be settled by the unconscious yet tidal sweep
of current events, to be left to slow and sporadic pin-pricking by
judges deciding individual cases with the help of conflict of laws
criteria. In the first place, court cases constitute a sparse and atypical
sampling of the entire grist of international economic activity. Fur-
thermore, the "sense of justice" and "just results" that an adequate
system of conflict of laws is expected to promote 1 0 2 has thus far
largely been limited to striking a private balance between the parties
involved, and has tended to ignore the public law implications of the
concept of justice. It is increasingly true, particularly of the distrib-
utive aspect of justice, 0 3 that justice must seek its effectuation in
the domain of public law and must look to the state as its primary
sponsor. It is therefore somewhat unfortunate that the administra-
tion of distributive justice still depends, in the present scheme of
things, on an adversary scheme of presentation by private parties,
which frequently does not allow for a full revelation of the facts and
policies relevant to the public interest. Indicative of the extent to
which private interest considerations dominate current conflict of
laws solutions of international economic disputes is the emphasis
ioi. See, e. g., STALEY, WORu ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 310 (1939). A charter
is, of course, only an administrative mechanism, but a mechanism rendered desirable
by the probably slow development of legislative standards in this field. The elabora-
tion of standards, and the clarification of interests which it is incumbent upon such an
international authority to clarify and protect, must be the subject of continuing inter-
national palaver and agreement.
1O2. See Cavers, supra, note 44 at 200.
zo3. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEA ETHICS ioo6 (McKeon Basic Aristotle 194).
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placed on maximum enforceability of contractual promises 104 and on
certainty of predictability of legal consequences. 10 5 Meritorious as
these canons are for the accommodation of purely private interests,
they should yield where incompatible with public interests of a higher
urgency.
1 6
Litigation has the additional disadvantage of involving a fortu-
itous selection of cases, so that it results in a discontinuous drafting
of public policy rather than in a firm and uninterrupted delineation
thereof. American and English judges, with whom public policy is an
unpopular conception, have commendably recognized the incom-
petence of judicial process as a framer of public policy, by adopting
a narrow construction of what are public policy issues and by being
unwilling to make decisions that involve choices among conflicting
political ideologies and matters primarily within the competence of
the political and diplomatic arms of government.
Dissatisfaction with conflict of laws tests and procedures should
not, however, blind us to the fact that legislative and administrative
changes of the kind that will develop into a new public international
law are a matter of glacial evolution. In the interim, we must still
look to some framework which will reconcile conflicts of laws. It
would be presumptuous, on the frail basis of this essay, to advance
any revolutionary or even novel suggestions in this field. It may be
in order, however, to recapitulate a few general comments already
explicit or implicit in the current literature. Thus, it is suggested
that some of the superfluous logical exercises that constitute our con-
flict of laws system be dispensed with. Pr6fessor Cavers has shown
how little valid service is performed by the mental operations that
cluster about the problem of choice of laws, yet it is evident that the
intellectual carrying charges are heavy.10 7  The work of Professors
Cook, Lorenzen, Cheatham, and others, clearly shows that the "con-
flict of laws" operations of concepts like "substance," "personal prop-
1O4. Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43
YALE L. J. 1082, 1100-I, 1107-8 (1934). A variant formulation is that good faith
international transactions requires that they be upheld. See Neuner, supra, note 52 at
499. It is characteristic of this trend of thought that it favors the conflict rules which
would allow the maximum amount of damages to the plaintiff. Heilman, mspra, at
1105.
105. Heilman, supra, note 104 at To99.
io6. It is, of course, not contended that public interests are always of higher
urgency than private ones, or that the public interest does not comprehend private inter-
ests. It is recognized that "private" and "public" rights are not mutually exclusive
categories; that there are private means of enforcing public rights; and that individual
rights are conceived by "public" action. See Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate
Administrative Process, 25 IowA L. REv. 485 (1940) : The Public Right Dogma in
Labor Board Cases. 59 HARv. L. REV. 72o (1946). Public interests as used in this
discussion refer to that residual increment of social values over and above the satisfac-
tion of individual interests.
107. See Cavers, supra, note 44; Note, 33 CoL. L. REv. 508, 513 (1933).
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erty," etc., frequently bear no relationship to their internal law defi-
nitions and genesis 10 -another area for the liquidation of bankrupt
intellectual machinery. Concurrently with these two lines of what
one might call the elimination of superfluous intellectual holding com-
panies should go a continuing process of intellectual recapitalization
and reorganization. Private and public interests, like financial
securities, do not retain at all times their initial market valuation-
they appreciate or depreciate in value. Obsolescence or change of
social machinery may change the relative importance of the interests
recognized by society, just as similar obsolescence or change in the
industrial field deflates or inflates security values. Therefore, it is
incumbent on judges and others, when weighing the interests of the
parties, of the forum, and of other jurisdictions connected with a
transaction, to give those interests the most current appraisal pos-
sible, and not to place high values on interests that perished or were
outmoded with an earlier social and economic era.
While imperfections in the existent conflict of laws system are
inevitable, this essay is not a plea for the instantaneous adoption of
global law, or for the abandonment of tested municipal legal systems
or policies except after due deliberation and sincere concurrence. A
system of private international law (conflict of laws) has a definite
social viability that is not characteristic of a system of public inter-
national law; what in public international law is a direct clash of
sovereignties is in private international law sublimated into a con-
flict of legal doctrines.i1sa From the standpoint of speedy practical re-
sults, therefore, we should keep on improving the system of private
international law. Under that system, states perform out of a sense
of fairness and ethical justice (the lineal descendant of the old con-
flicts doctrine of "comity") what no amount of physical and moral
compulsion under a public international order could make them do.
It should also be borne in mind that universality and uniformity
of application is not necessarily synonymous with excellence, and that
contrariety of creed is one of the fundamental values of an expansive
civilization 09 Homogeneity of law is of secondary importance to
lo8. See notes 45 and 46, supra.
io8a. There is a school of thought which contends that there is no essential dis-
tinction between private and public international law in that both involve conflicts
between sovereigns. See Starke, The Relation between Private and Public Interna-
tional Law, 27 L. Q. REV. 395 (1936). The type of conflict involved in settling a con-
flicts case is, however, largely a cerebral one that can be resolved by individual judges
and not a full scale political conflict accompanied by all the trappings of diplomatic
conferences and negotiations, such as characterize an important disagreement in the
public international law fields. More conventional Anglo-American theory regards
private international law as a category of municipal law and differentiates it completely
from public international law.
lo9. "That variety, which is the condition of progress, must be preserved at what-
ever cost of immediate convenience." BATY, op. cit. supra, note 45 at 13.
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the production and practical application of the best possible system
of law that people can devise. Moreover, legal homogeneity can be
achieved in other ways than by formulating general propositions
which immediately become universally accepted; as in the past, it can
be attained by the more gradual process of selection and amalgama-
tion among discordant legal systems of limited scope."10  The
"harmony" of legal doctrine that is one of the professed objectives of
conflict of laws systems would, in a legal world full of clashing basic
social and philosophical premises, dissenting opinions, reversed lower
courts, etc., be largely illusory even if there were no conflicting
systems of laws. For this reason, the fact that American business
enterprises must carry on their overseas operations in localities with
legal systems based on different economic premises than our own does
not require us to jettison our own carefully thought out legal and eco-
nomic system, as has, for example, been proposed by certain protag-
onists of cartels."1  Rather we should continue to strive to obtain
for our own viewpoints the widest practicable scope, both by applying
our own municipal law to its fullest legitimate extent and by gaining
acceptance of our principles in the legislatures of other countries and
in international law.
While divergent public policies may thus continue to be given
effect, this should be with discretion and progressive diminution.
Differences from internationally accepted norms should be encour-
aged only when they involve essentials. The policies and preconcep-
tions of the domestic jurisdiction should not be indentified with the
optimum policy for international affairs in economic situations that
are in their essence linked to foreign jurisdictions. In the case alike
where a forum insists on a negative deference or positive adherence to
its public policy, such an insistence should be predicated on the sub-
stantiality of the social and private interests under its guardianship
which it conceives to be impaired by non-application of its public
policy."
2
iio. As was true of the jis genthum of the Roman law, id. at 172-5.
iii. This thesis, advanced by Milo Perkins in Cartels: What Siall We Do About
Themf i89 HARPER'S 570 (Nov. 1944), is wisely answered by Judge Rifkind in United
States v. National Lead Company, 63 F. Supp. 513, 526 (S. D. N. Y. 1945). Cf. also
Lockwood and Schmeisser, Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade, ii
LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoB. 663 (z946).
112. Applying this test, the author, for example, disagrees with Nussbaum's
recommendation that our courts take a vigorous stand against the expropriatory and
foreign exchange policies of other states. See NussDAum, op. cit. supra, note 6 at
1041. Despite the divergence of those policies from our own economic norms, the cases
he deals with involve a paucity of contacts with our own domestic jurisdiction.
Likewise, the general willingness to uphold arbitration contracts should be qualified
by scrutiny of the possibility that the parties may have desired to avoid the application
of law represented by a jurisdiction with a major interest in the transaction, see note
57 supra.
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Whatever the final allocation of interests to national or to inter-
national organs for protection and administrative implementation,
one proposition seems clear-the territorial scope of the regulatory
and enforcement power should in the main be co-extensive with the
territorial impact of the activities regulated and interests to be pro-
tected. It was recognized by the Founders of the Constitution that
"the regulation of commerce was in itself a matter indivisible." 113 If
this was true over a hundred and fifty years ago, it is at least true, in
the age of the Atomic Bomb, that, if the power to regulate has to be
divided, there can be no unregulated gaps in that partition.
113. John Madison, as cited in ERsT, op. cit. msp ra, note 63 at 144.
